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IS ALL CORPORATE TAX PLANNING GOOD FOR 
SHAREHOLDERS? 
Forthcoming, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2018) 
Omri Marian* 
“The executives who run America’s corporations have a fiduciary duty 
to maximize profit for their shareholders. That’s what they’re programmed 
to do. One way to maximize profits is to minimize taxes, something G.E. does 
better than just about any other company. If I were a G.E. shareholder, I 
would be thrilled to learn that its vaunted 1,000-person tax department is 
viewed within the company as a profit center.”1 
Abstract: Does corporate tax planning benefit shareholders? The 
prevalent assumption is that it does, because lower corporate tax burden 
translates to enhanced shareholder value. In this article, I explain why this 
common perception is sometimes incorrect in practice. In many cases, 
successful (and legal) corporate tax planning schemes are not Pareto-
optimal: some shareholders may see a net benefit, while others experience a 
net loss. Moreover, in certain instances it is reasonable to expect that legal 
corporate tax planning will be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. Meaning, the 
financial losses incurred by some shareholders exceed the gains to others. I 
identify a previously underappreciated agency problem, due to which 
shareholders usually approve detrimental corporate tax plans, even when 
information about the detriment is freely available. I also show that 
shareholders who benefit from corporate tax plans would, in some instances, 
rationally cooperate with managerial rent extraction, when such rent 
extraction defuses managerial opposition to the corporate tax-saving plan. 
The transactions I describe operate to shift the corporate tax burden from 
some shareholders to others, while enriching managers in the process. I 
discuss the legal and the normative implications of this phenomenon and 
explore several potential remedies.  
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. For helpful 
comments and critique, I am indebted to Adam Rosenzweig, Chris Sanchirico, Reed 
Shuldiner, Emily Satterthwaite, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Elizabeth Pollman, Frank Partnoi, Vic 
Fleischer, Cathy Hwang, Jeff Schwartz, Yariv Brauner, David Hasen, Danny Sokol, Sarah 
Lawsky and participants at workshops and conferences at The University of Florida College 
of Law, The University of Utah College of Law, Loyola Law School (LA), The University 
of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the University 
of California, Irvine School of Law. Any errors or omissions are my own.  
1 Joe Nocera, Who Could Blame GE?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A23. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under our corporate income tax system, corporate income is taxed twice, 
once at the entity-level (the corporate income tax), and once again at the 
shareholder-level (upon receipt of dividends or the disposition of corporate 
stock at a gain).2 Tax-savings at either the corporate-level or the shareholder-
level reduce the overall tax burden, and presumably increases net value to 
shareholders.3 
Shareholders control their own individual tax planning and can act to 
reduce their shareholder-level tax liability, with the aid of their personal tax 
advisors. At the corporate-level, however, managers operate as the 
shareholders’ tax-planning agents.4 The accepted view, therefore, is that 
managers should engage in tax planning that reduce corporate-level tax 
                                                 
2 This “double taxation” system has been, and still is, the subject of an extensive 
academic inquiry. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate 
Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517 (2009); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the 
Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L. J. 889 (2006) [hereinafter Capital Lock-In]; Jennifer 
Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE. L. J. 325 
(1995); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income 
Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).  
3 Arlen & Weiss, id., at 338 (“Integration, corporate rate cuts, and capital gains cuts all 
confer windfalls on existing shareholders. The windfalls result from the fact that the price of 
any asset reflects expected after-tax returns”); David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate 
Governance: The Influence of Tax on Managerial Agency Costs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE Ch. 43, ¶5.2 (Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe 
eds., 2015) (“To shareholders, lowering the tax bill is likely to enhance returns… In general, 
shareholders have reason to value tax planning even more than managers, since shareholders 
do not bear the same downside risks”). 
4 Keith J. Crockera & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs, 89 J. OF 
PUB. ECON. 1593, 1596 (2005) (“[I]n a large, publicly held corporation, decisions about taxes 
(and accounting) are not made by the shareholders directly but, rather, by their agents, 
whether that is the chief financial officer or the vice president for taxation”). 
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liability, in order to enhance shareholders’ value.5 Some commentators go as 
far as to suggest that corporate managers have a fiduciary duty to their 
shareholders to minimize corporate tax liability,6 though this view is 
questionable.7 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2014) [hereinafter Corporate Social 
Responsibility] (Under the nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation, which is the dominant 
view among corporate scholars, “management arguably has a responsibility to maximize 
shareholder profits by minimizing corporate taxes as much as possible”); Michelle Hanlon 
& Joel Slemrod, What does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions 
to News about Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. OF PUB. ECON. 126, 126 (2009) (“Of course, in 
order to maximize the value of the firm, shareholders would like to minimize corporate tax 
payments net of the private costs of doing so.”); Wolfgang Schön, Tax and Corporate 
Governance: A Legal Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31, 46 (Wolfgang 
Schön, ed., 2008) (“The basic goal which offers guidance for the actions of the management 
under the ‘corporate contract’ is wealth maximization for investors. . . This makes the 
minimization of the corporate tax burden an integral part of the managers’ duty of care”);  
6 See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 1; Boris Johnson, We All want Apple to Pay more Tax, 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 24, 2016, 9:06 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12118898/We-all-want-Apple-to-
pay-more-tax.html (“It is the fiduciary duty of [corporate] finance directors to minimise tax 
exposure. They have a legal obligation to their shareholders”). Fred Imbert, Cramer: Apple’s 
Tim Cook ‘Patriotic’ on Taxes, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:08 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/21/cramer-apples-tim-cook-patriotic-on-taxes.html (citing 
Jim Cramer responding to criticism on Apple Inc.’s tax planning stating that “"The main 
thing you learn is that tax avoidance is everybody's … duty. You're supposed to try to 
avoid").  
7 There are very few cases directly addressing this issue. Courts that did address this 
issue were reluctant to rule that corporate managers have an affirmative duty to minimize 
corporate taxes. See, e.g., Freedman v. Adams, No. CIV.A. 4199-VCN, 2012 WL 1345638, 
at 12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013) (“The 
Plaintiff does not cite any case law of this Court or the Delaware Supreme Court directly 
supporting the purported fiduciary duty to minimize taxes… For reasons that are both 
numerous and obvious, this Court is not convinced that it should endorse this proposed new 
duty”); Seinfeld v. Slager, No. CIV.A. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at 3 (Del. Ch. June 
29, 2012) (“[A] decision to pursue or forgo tax savings is generally a business decision for 
the board of directors. Accordingly, despite the Plaintiff's contentions, Delaware law is clear 
that there is no separate duty to minimize taxes, and a failure to do so is not automatically a 
waste of corporate assets”). For additional analysis of the lack of managers’ duty to minimize 
taxes see, e.g., Charles Gass, Outer Limits: Fiduciary Duties and the Doctrine of Waste, 92 
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 97-98 (2015); Daniel Hemel, A “Duty” to Minimize Taxes?, 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/a-duty-to-minimize-taxes.html; Avi-
Yonah, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 5, at 2 (“This Article will address the 
question of whether publicly traded U.S. corporations owe a duty to their shareholders to 
minimize their corporate tax burden through any legal means, or if instead, strategic 
behaviors like aggressive tax-motivated transactions are inconsistent with corporate social 
responsibility (‘CSR’). I believe the latter holds true, regardless of one's view of the 
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In this article, I dispute the notion that legal corporate tax planning 
necessarily enhances shareholders’ value. I explain how corporate-level tax 
reducing strategies may increase the overall tax burden on shareholders. 
Specifically, I contribute to the growing literature on taxation and corporate 
governance by making the following arguments: First, I show that in many 
cases, successful (and legal) corporate tax planning schemes are not Pareto-
optimal.8 Some shareholders may see a net increase in value, while other 
experience a net loss. Second, I show that in certain instances it is reasonable 
to expect that legal corporate tax planning schemes will be Kaldor-Hicks 
inefficient (I sometimes refer to such transaction as “overall inefficient” 
transactions).9 Meaning, the losses to some shareholders may exceed the 
gains to others.10 Third, I show that because of an underappreciated agency 
problem, shareholders usually approve harmful corporate-level tax schemes, 
even when the information about the potential detriment is freely available.11 
Specifically, I describe instances of corporate tax planning in which some 
shareholders may rationally cooperate with managerial rent extraction.  
The legal construct underlying these arguments is that corporate-level 
taxation and shareholder-level taxation are not separate from one another. 
Even though corporations are separate taxpayers from their shareholders, 
many corporate-level transactions affect shareholder-level tax liabilities. I 
denote corporate-level transactions that have a taxable effect on shareholder-
level taxes “STCTs” (Shareholder Taxable Corporate Transactions). STCTs 
are a regular occurrence in U.S. financial markets.12 For example, a 
corporation may pursue a merger under the assumption that the post-merger 
corporate structure is more tax-efficient than current structure. The merger 
itself, however, may be taxable to shareholders, even if shareholders do not 
dispose of their stock, but simply replace their original stock for stock of the 
merged corporation.13 Similarly, a foreign corporation may earn income that 
                                                 
corporation”).  
8 A transaction is “Pareto optimal” to shareholders if at least one shareholder is better 
off because of the transaction and no shareholder is worse off. See, RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §1.2 (9th ed., 2014). (“A Pareto-superior transaction (or 
‘Pareto Improvement’) is one that makes at least one person better off and no one worse 
off”). See discussion infra, at Part I.b. 
9 A transaction is “Kaldor-Hicks efficient” if it maximizes shareholder wealth in the 
aggregate. Meaning, shareholders who benefit from the transaction gain enough, so they 
could theoretically compensate losing shareholders for their losses. See, Posner id. (A 
transaction is Kaldor Hicks efficient if “The winners could compensate losers, whether or 
not they actually do”).  
10 See discussion infra, at Part I.c.  
11 See discussion infra, at Part I.d.  
12 See discussion infra, at Part II. 
13 See discussion infra, at Part III.a.ii. 
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is taxable to U.S. shareholders, even if shareholders receive no distribution 
from the corporation.14 There are multiple examples of in-corporate 
transactions that are taxable to shareholders.15 Thus, in order to assess 
whether shareholders benefit from corporate-level tax-savings, one must also 
consider potential shareholder-level tax costs. Current literature on corporate 
tax and corporate governance largely misses this point.16 
Significantly, shareholder experience of the interaction of corporate-level 
and shareholder-level taxes varies, because shareholders have heterogeneous 
tax preferences.17 Shareholder-level tax outcomes depend on each 
shareholder’s individual tax circumstances.18 In STCTs, different 
shareholders of the same corporation may face different amounts of taxable 
income, face different tax rates, and may be able to utilize different personal 
tax benefits. As a result, STCTs trigger different shareholder-level tax 
consequences to each shareholder. After netting shareholder-level tax 
outcomes against corporate-level tax savings, some shareholders may see a 
net tax benefit from an STCT, while other may see a net tax detriment. 
Nonetheless, if shareholders who benefit from an STCT have the majority 
vote—they will approve the transaction even if it is not Pareto-optimal or 
overall inefficient. 
In U.S. equity markets, shareholders who benefit from STCTs indeed 
hold the majority vote in most cases. Specifically, several recent studies find 
that tax-exempt shareholders hold the majority of publicly traded equities in 
U.S. markets.19 These tax-exempt shareholders always see a net benefit from 
an STCT, because they share in corporate-level tax savings, but experience 
                                                 
14 For example, under “Subpart F” of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC §§951-965), 
certain income of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders is deemed distributed 
by the foreign corporations to their U.S. shareholders, even if no actual distribution took 
place. See also, discussion infra, at Part III.a.i. 
15 See discussion infra, at Part III.a. 
16 See Discussion infra, at Part II. 
17 For a discussion of shareholders’ heterogeneity in tax preferences with respect to their 
equity holdings, see Doran, supra note 2, at 542-547; Omri Marian, Reconciling Tax Law 
and Securities Regulations, 48 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 1, 10-13 (2014) [hereinafter Tax and 
Securities Regulation]. 
18 Marian, id, at 13 (“[T]he tax consequences of securities investments vary among 
investors, even if all are ‘reasonable investors’, and even if one makes numerous simplifying 
assumptions”).   
19 See Leonard E. Burman, Kimberly A. Clausing, & Lydia Austin, Is U.S. Corporate 
Income Double Taxed? 70 NAT’L TAX J. 675, 701 (2017) (estimating “that the taxable share 
of U.S. corporate equity has declined dramatically in recent years, from more than 80 percent 
in 1965 to about 27 percent at present”); Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The 
Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923 (May 16, 2016) 
(Finding that “the share of U.S. corporate stock held in taxable accounts fell more than two-
thirds over the last 50 years, from 83.6 percent in 1965 to 24.2 percent in 2015”).  
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no shareholder-level tax cost (due to their tax-exempt status). Since tax-
exempt shareholders have the majority, we should expect shareholders to 
vote in favor of STCTs. STCTs are indeed a common occurrence in U.S. 
markets.20 Being in minority, taxable shareholders cannot prevent an STCT, 
even if their shareholder-level tax cost outweighs their share in the corporate-
level savings (in terms of net present value, or NPV). Their only recourse is 
litigation.21 
By “tax-exempt shareholders” I mean all the special purpose entities that 
qualify for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), such 
as educational institutions’ endowments, charitable organizations, pension-
funds, governmental entities and others,22 as well as foreign investors in U.S. 
equities, who are—for the most part—exempt from U.S. shareholder-level 
taxation.23  
Managers play a pivotal role in this context. In STCTs, managers have 
competing incentives. The first incentive stems from managers’ interest in 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Anton Babkin, Brent Glover & Oliver Levine, Are Corporate Inversions 
Good for Shareholders? 126 J. OF FIN. ECON. 1 227 (2017) (empirically analyzing tax 
inversion transaction and finding that “ for taxable shareholders with a sufficiently low basis 
or high capital gains tax rate… the personal tax costs can exceed the corporate tax benefits”); 
Bradley T. Borden, Rethinking the Tax Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 
527, 562-566 (2015) (Analyzing tax-induced REIT spinoff transactions, describing a 
scenario under which overall shareholder tax liability (shareholder-level plus corporate-
level) increases, even though corporate-level tax liability decreases). 
21 STCTs have indeed been subject to litigation. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. S'holder 
Litig., 900 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 2017); Gumm et al v. Molinaroli et. al., 2017 WL 1056052 
(E.D.Wis.) [hereinafter: Johnson Controls Complaint]. 
22 I.R.C. §§501-530, 892 exempt multiple types of special purposes entities from 
taxation.  
23 While foreign taxpayers doing business in the United States are not per-se tax exempt, 
certain rule applicable to the taxation of cross border transaction make such investors 
functionally tax exempt or almost tax exempt. Generally, in the case of passive investment 
income by foreign residents (meaning, where the investor does not actively participate in the 
management of the investment), the United States only impose tax on foreign taxpayers’ 
income form source within the United States. I.R.C. §§871, 881. The source of gain from the 
disposition of non-depreciable personal property—such as corporate stock—is determined 
by reference to the residence of the taxpayer. I.R.C. §865. Thus when a foreign resident sells 
the stock of a U.S. corporation at a gain, the income is source outside the United States, and 
therefore not taxable in the United States. In addition, most developed countries would not 
tax their residents’ gains from the sale of foreign equity if certain conditions are met. Thus, 
in many instance, the gain from the sale of a U.S. corporation by a foreign resident is never 
taxed. Dividends distributed by a U.S. corporation to a foreign resident are nominally taxed 
at a flat rate of 30 percent. I.R.C. 871. However, the United States has bilateral tax treaties 
with multiple countries. Under such treaties, the withholding tax on dividends is reduced 
significantly. For discussion on the de-facto tax exemption of foreign investors in U.S. equity 
markets, see David Schizer, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or 
Shareholders (Or Both), 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1880-81 (2016).     
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their capacity as shareholders. Managers usually hold equity in the 
corporations they manage as a form of incentive compensation.24 Managers’ 
personal shareholder-level tax interest may be different from the interest of 
other shareholders25, such as tax-exempt shareholders. Specifically, because 
managers are likely taxable individuals,26 their shareholder-level tax-interests 
align with the interests of taxable shareholders. As such, managers should 
rationally oppose inefficient STCTs. In addition, several provisions under the 
I.R.C. impose direct tax on managers in the context of certain STCTs.27 This 
adds an additional incentive for managers to oppose STCTs. However, 
managers also have a second, competing interest, in their capacity as 
managers. If managers’ compensation is linked to the after-tax performance 
of the corporation (which is likely to be the case), managers can enhance their 
compensation by minimizing corporate-level taxes.28 This incentivizes 
managers to support STCTs.   
Managers can solve their personal conflict of incentives. Since managers 
control the transaction structure, they can require the corporation to 
indemnify them for their personal shareholder-level tax cost associated with 
the transaction. This is known as a “tax gross up payment”. Such gross-up 
payments are common in practice.29 The tax gross up is an additional cost for 
the corporation in the transaction. However, if the corporate-level tax savings 
outweighs the cost of the gross-up, there is some corporate net savings left 
for other (non-manager) shareholders to share in. Since tax-exempt 
shareholders—who likely hold the majority vote—benefit from any 
corporate tax savings, they would rationally agree to gross up managers. It is 
probably always the case that there remains a net corporate benefit in spite of 
                                                 
24 Doran, supra note 2, at 536 (“[M]any managers occupy a dual position: they are both 
managers and shareholders”). 
25 Hideki Kanda & Saul, Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 
77 VA. L. REV. 211, 230 (1991). “([Managers’] self-interest may not be aligned with the 
interests of other shareholders: the timing of the disposition of assets, and in tax returns, the 
recognition of gains and losses”). 
26 Only special purpose organizations that meet certain requirements qualify for the 
exemption under the I.R.C. Individuals are generally taxable.  
27 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4985 (imposing excise tax on managers’ value equity-based 
compensation in an inversion transaction); I.R.C. § 4999 (imposing an excise tax on 
managers’ “golden parachute” payments). 
28 Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-
Powered Incentives, 79 J. OF FIN. ECON., 145, 147 (2006). (“Greater incentive compensation 
helps align the incentives of agents and principals and leads managers to be more aggressive 
about increasing firm value through tax avoidance”). 
29 David I. Walker, Another (Critical) Look at the Inversion Excise Tax, 151 TAX NOTES 
947, 951 (May 16, 2016) (“Although criticized by proxy advisory firms, agreements to make 
executives whole on an after-tax basis for some tax obligations remain persistent”) 
[Hereinafter Another Critical Look]. 
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the gross up, because corporate-level tax savings are likely in orders of 
magnitude larger than the tax detriment to a few managers who hold only a 
small equity interest in the corporation.30  
When a corporation grosses-up managers in an STCT, the managers’ 
personal shareholder-level tax cost is extinguished. This functionally 
converts managers into “tax-exempt” shareholders, but just for purposes of 
the specific transaction at issue. The only interest that managers are left with 
is their interest to enhance their compensation by increasing the after-tax 
corporate income. Tax-exempt shareholders still receive a net benefit (albeit 
smaller than if there was no gross-up), while taxable shareholders simply 
suffer an additional economic burden (their share of the cost of the gross-up). 
The gross-up payment is a simple case of managerial rent extraction, having 
the corporation carry managers’ personal tax burden. 
To summarize, STCTs present a previously underappreciated corporate 
governance issue: tax-exempt shareholders rationally cooperate with 
managerial rent extraction, and approve non Pareto-optimal, and even overall 
inefficient corporate tax-planning schemes. Taxable minority shareholders 
can do nothing as they see their net investment value decreases. 
Economically, one can view such transactions as a transfer of value from one 
group of shareholders to another group of shareholders, and to managers. 
Ironically, another potential beneficiary of such inefficient corporate tax-
planning transactions could be the United States Department of Treasury. If 
the tax detriment to taxable shareholders outweighs the corporate-level tax 
saving, it means the government collects more tax (but only from taxable 
shareholders) than it loses from the corporate tax plan.31 While this may be 
the case in the context of a few outlier transactions, on average (taking into 
account all corporate tax-savings transactions) the government probably still 
loses revenue.32 
                                                 
30 Id. (“[I]n cases in which gross-ups have occurred, the amounts, while eye-popping in 
isolation, represent only a small fraction of deal value”). 
31 Rita Nevada Gunn & Thomas Z. Lys, The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate Inversions on 
US Tax Revenue 37 (August 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596706 (Argue that “inversions actually increase taxes to the US 
Treasury, in the form of increases in post-inversion cash dividends and, potentially, capital 
gains”). 
32 While some transactions may actually beneficial in terms of revenue collection, these 
are outliers. In most cases, the government lose revenue, and thus lose on an average basis. 
See, e.g., Babkin, Glover & Levine, supra note 20, at 228 (“the aggregate effect across all 
shareholders (taxable and tax-exempt) is a 3.0% increase in value.” This suggests that the 
aggregate effect is still tax reducing, which means the government losses revenue); Austan 
Goolsbee & Edward Maydew, Taxes and Organizational Form: The Case of REIT Spin–offs, 
55 NAT’L TAX J. 441, 443-444 (2002) (finding moderate revenue loss after taking into 
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The STCT governance problem I identify adds to the growing literature 
that criticize shareholder value maximization as a normative linchpin for 
assessing management behavior.33 Managers cannot know what the personal 
tax position of each shareholder is, and what might be the tax effect of an 
STCT on each shareholder. Under such circumstances, claiming that 
managers should (or should not) engage in corporate tax planning because it 
benefits shareholders is a logically incoherent argument.     
STCTs also have important normative implications in terms of efficiency 
and fairness. The efficiency problem can be summarized as follows: 
shareholder-level tax-heterogeneity, coupled with the fact that tax-exempt 
shareholders control most votes in the U.S. market, encourages inefficient 
corporate tax planning transactions, even when information is freely available 
in the market.34 
The fairness problem is more nuanced.35 Assuming Congress designed 
our tax system with particular distributive policies in mind, STCTs violate 
such policies through private action. Specifically, an STCT increases the tax 
burden on some unwilling shareholders to a level that is in excess of the level 
intended by the government. At the same time, STCT decreases the tax 
burden on other shareholders to a level below the one intended by the 
government.   
There are several potential solutions to this problem.36 I consider market-
based solutions, tax-based solutions, and corporate-law based solutions. 
Market based solutions are unlikely to be a panacea. As long as tax-exempt 
investors control the majority vote, the market is unlikely to correct 
managers’ distorted tax incentives. Tax-based solutions to similar problems 
have failed in the past, or would simply result in different types of agency 
costs. I argue that corporate-governance based solutions that would empower 
taxable shareholders seem to be the most promising.37  
The rest of the Article continues as follows: In Part I, I present numerical 
stylized examples to explain my main descriptive argument. I show how 
STCTs may be detrimental to shareholders, and how agency costs may 
transpire in such transactions. I generalize the stylized examples in a formal 
model in the Appendix. In Part II, I explain how the unique corporate tax 
planning dynamics I identify contribute to the vast literature on the 
relationship between corporate tax and corporate governance. In Part III, I 
                                                 
account shareholder level taxes in REIT spinoff transactions). 
33 See discussion infra, at IV.a.i. 
34 See discussion infra, at IV.a.ii. 
35 See discussion infra, at IV.a.iii. 
36 See discussion infra, at Part IV.b.  
37 See discussion infra, at Part IV.b.iii 
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move from theory to practice. I use the framework I develop in parts II and 
III to explore two types of popular STCTs in U.S. financial markets: 
“corporate inversions”, and “REIT spin-offs”. I show that such transactions 
are usually not Pareto-optimal, and may sometimes be overall inefficient. In 
Part IV, I consider the normative and legal implications of my descriptive 
arguments and discuss several ways to address the governance issues 
associated with STCTs. 
I. SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE TAX PLANNING MAY BE DETRIMENTAL 
TO SHAREHOLDERS 
In this part, I use several stylized examples to explain how—contrary to 
common perception—corporate tax planning may result in an increased tax 
burden on shareholders. The tax rates I use in the examples are similar to the 
tax rates in place before the recent tax reform (also known as the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, or TCJA).38 The reason to use such rates is to approximate the 
potential tax outcomes of actual transactions (discussed in part III) that have 
taken place in recent years (before the enactment of the TCJA). 
The new tax rates prescribed by the TCJA do not change the analysis. The 
stylized examples simply introduce the conceptual generic argument. 
Applying different tax rates does not affect that. Moreover, it is likely that 
the TCJA rates strengthen the conceptual argument. The reason is that the 
TCJA significantly reduced the corporate-level tax rate, from thirty-five 
percent, to twenty-one percent39 while making relatively minor changes to 
the rates applicable to shareholder-level income. This means that corporate-
level tax savings are now less valuable compared with previous law, while 
shareholder-level taxes are just as costly. This means that a STCT is more 
likely to be overall burden increasing to taxable shareholders.  
In Subpart A, I outline the parameters for the examples to follow, and 
explain the underlying assumptions. In Subpart B, I demonstrate a simple 
case of non-Pareto-optimal outcome of corporate tax planning. In Subpart C, 
I show that an overall inefficient outcome is possible. In Subpart D, I discuss 
the effects of tax gross-up payments to managers. In Subpart E, I adjust the 
examples to account for multiple periods. 
In the Appendix, I offer a generalized formal model for the issues 
discussed in this SubPart.   
a. Set-Up and Assumptions 
Assume ExCo is a domestic corporation, with a value of $1,000. ExCo’s 
                                                 
38 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [Hereinafter: 
TCJA].  
39 Id., § 13001. 
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profits are subject corporate level tax at a rate of 40%.40 ExCo has only one 
class of stock, and three groups of shareholders: 
1. Tax-exempt shareholders (TEs). TEs are not subject to tax in their 
individual capacity. For example, any gain from the sale of their stock 
in ExCo is not taxable. Similarly, they do not pay tax on any dividends 
they receive from ExCo. TEs own 60% of ExCo’s stock.41  
2. Taxable shareholders (TXs). TXs own 30% of ExCo’s stock. TXs are 
subject to tax in their individual capacity. For ease of analysis, we 
shall assume that all TXs have the same tax interest42 and are subject 
to the same personal tax rate of 25%.43 This tax rate would apply, for 
example, to dividends TXs receive from ExCo, and to TXs’ gain from 
the sale of their ExCo stock. Gain from the sale of capital assets (such 
as corporate stock) is generally the difference between the fair market 
value of the asset at the time of disposition, and the taxpayer’s basis 
in the asset.44 Assume that TXs’ aggregate basis in their stock is $60.  
3. Managers (Ms). Ms manage ExCo. Ms also own 10% of ExCo’s 
equity as a form of incentive pay. Like TXs, Ms are taxable 
shareholders. Ms’ basis in their ExCo stock is $20. 
Assume that all corporate tax savings accrue to shareholders. For 
example, if ExCo is able to save $10 in tax liability, the value of the corporate 
stock increases by $10, and shareholders share in the value-increase in 
                                                 
40 Such an assumption is reasonable under the pre-TCJA rates. The top federal corporate 
tax rate in the United States was 35%. Adding state and local corporate taxes to the federal 
tax rate brings the average marginal tax rate on corporate income very close to 40%. See, 
Kari Jahnsen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporate Income Tax Rates around the World, 2017, TAX 
FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT NO. 559 2 (Sep., 2017) (finding that “the federal statutory rate of 
35 percent plus an average of the corporate income taxes levied by individual states” is 
38.91%).  
41 As explained above, this is a reasonable assumption based on recent studies finding 
that tax-exempt entities hold the majority in U.S. equity markets. See, supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
42 In reality, taxable shareholders vary in their tax preferences. See, Marian, Tax Law 
and Securities Regulation, supra note 17. However, for purposes of the stylized model I 
simply divide all shareholder into two categories of tax interests in order to present the 
conceptual argument about shareholders tax heterogeneity.    
43 This assumption is reasonably close to reality. Under current law, the top statutory tax 
rate applied to long-term capital gains and certain qualified dividends is 20%. I.R.C. §1. In 
addition, certain taxpayers with adjusted gross income above a specific threshold are subject 
to tax on “net investment income” at a rate of 3.8%. This tax applies to capital gains and 
dividends income. I.R.C. §1411. Thus, the total tax paid at the shareholder level on gains 
from long term investments or qualified dividends is 23.8%.  
44 I.R.C. §1001  
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proportion to their ownership interests. In reality, of course, it is not at all 
clear who bears the burden of corporate taxation, and who benefits from 
corporate tax savings.45 Theoretically, corporate tax can burden labor in the 
form of lower wages, burden capital in the form of lower stock price, or 
burden consumers in the form of higher prices on corporate products.46 For 
purposes of the examples, the most conservative assumption is that 
shareholders reap all the benefits of corporate tax savings.47 
Also assume that any tax planning schemes by ExCo bear no planning 
costs, and that they are legal. This, again, is a conservative assumption. In 
reality there are always costs associated with a tax planning transaction,48 and 
almost all tax planning schemes contain some level of legal uncertainty.49 
Planning costs and legal uncertainty reduce the utility of a tax planning 
arrangement.  
Finally, assume that Ms’ compensation is linked to ExCo’s after-tax 
financial results. Namely, a decrease in corporate tax liability results in an 
increase in Ms’ compensation. 
Benchmark: Shareholder value with no Planning. For simplicity, let us 
assume that ExCo’s value is its net asset value, and there is only one year of 
corporate operations (the examples can easily be extended to multiple period 
as I explain below50; I use one period for simplicity). Assume that during the 
year, ExCo earns additional $1,000 in taxable income, that ExCo does not 
engage in any tax planning, and makes no distributions to shareholders. 
Under such assumptions the expected after-tax value of ExCo at the end of 
                                                 
45 For a recent summary of the discussion on who bears the corporate tax burden, see 
Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. (2012).  
46 WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, OTA 
PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
1 (2007) (“The corporate tax could be borne by some combination of the shareholders of 
corporations, investors in all capital through a decrease in the overall return to capital, 
workers through a decrease in wages, and customers through increased output prices”). 
47 Less conservative assumption would take into account the fact that shareholders do 
not reap all the benefits from corporate savings. This would make it even more likely for 
shareholders to be overall losers from corporate tax planning. 
48 Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes, & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxation and the Dynamics 
of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS, 
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 271, 272 (John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Louis Lowenstein, & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988) (“For there to be a net tax gain 
as a result of an acquisition, the tax gain must exceed the transaction and information costs 
associated with the [acquisition]”). 
49 Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 257-68 
(2013) (developing a model to evaluate the utility of tax compliance taking into account legal 
uncertainties).    
50 See, infra at I.e 
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the year (V1) is: 
V1 = $1,000 + $1,000 x (1 – 0.4) = $1,600 
Considering the ownership interests in ExCo, the equity holding values 
of TEs, TXs, and Ms (expressed VTE, VTX, and VM, respectively) at the end 
of the year are: 
VTE = 60% x 1,600 = $960 
VTX = 30% x 1,600 = $480 
VMS = 10% x 1,600 = $160 
These “no-planning” values will serve as benchmarks for the examples 
below. 
In the case of TXs and Ms, there is an additional important assumption: 
That they do not intend to dispose of their stock in the foreseeable future. 
Otherwise, we should reduce the value to TXs and Ms by the expected tax 
cost upon disposition. Under the assumption in the examples, however, TXs 
and Ms plan to dispose of the stock far enough in the future, so the NPV of 
their shareholder-level tax is minimal, and therefore ignored.51 Even if this 
assumption is relaxed, the argument stands. The examples below could be 
replicated with a slightly reduced value to TXs and Ms (meaning, taking into 
account the NPV of their expected tax liability), by using slightly different 
numbers. I assume zero NPV of future taxes for the sake of simplicity. 






Tax Exempt (TE)  60%  N/A  $960 
Taxable (TX)  30%  $60  $480 
Managers (M)  10%  $20  $160 
 
b. Example 1 – Corporate Tax Planning that is not Pareto-
Optimal 
                                                 
51 This is a reasonable assumption, for example, for shares held in taxable investment 
for retirement (for example, in mutual funds). Consider TXs. Their expected gain from 
disposition of their stock would be the FMV of their stock minus their basis, or $480 - $60 = 
$420. At a 25% tax rate, their expected shareholder level tax liability is 0.25 x $420 = $105. 
Assuming TXs plan to hold the stock for 40 years until retirement, and market discount rate 
for a 40 year investment is 7%, the NPV of their currently expected tax liability is 
$105/(1.07)^40 = $7.01. For purpose of the example, we shall assume the NPV of future tax 
liabilities nears zero. 
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Assume now that before the beginning of the year, ExCo’s management 
identifies a tax planning opportunity. Under the plan, ExCo will be able to 
maintain its operational results (meaning, $1,000 in income), but will only 
have to report a portion of such income on its tax returns. The rest of the 
income remains untaxed. For example, assume that ExCo changes its place 
of incorporation for tax purposes, and becomes New ExCo, a foreign 
corporation (such transaction is known as an “inversion”).52 New ExCo is 
identical to ExCo, except by name and place of incorporation. Assume that 
the reincorporation enables New ExCo to avoid tax on 50% of its $1,000 
income. New ExCo’s end of the year value after planning (Vp) is:  
Vp = $1,000 + $500·(1 – 0.4) + $500 = $1,800 
ExCo’s value increases by the amount of tax saved (40% x $500 = $200). 
This makes the tax plan seem like a desirable transaction to all parties 
involved. 
However, now assume that the transaction is an STCT (as most inversions 
are). Namely, the tax-planning scheme deems the shareholders to dispose of 
their ExCo stock in exchange for New ExCo stock, in a taxable transaction. 
Also assume that after the transaction is announced, ExCo’s stock value 
increases to reflect the expected tax savings. This “deemed sale” of ExCo’s 
stock in exchange for New ExCo’s tock creates a taxable gain (with no 
associated cash flow) to each shareholder. 
The taxable gain is the difference between the fair market value of the 
stock, and the shareholder’s basis in the stock. For example, TXs now own 
stock valued at $540 (30% of $1,800). Their taxable gain is the difference 
between such value and their basis of $60, meaning $540 - $60 = $480. At a 
tax rate of 25%, their tax liability resulting from the transaction is 25% x $480 
= $120. Taking into account the tax liability, TXs’ net position value is $540 
– $120 = $420. This is less that the net value to TXs under the “no planning” 
benchmark of $480. 







                                                 
52 I discuss inversions below. Infra at Part III.b.  
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Table 2 














ExCo’s value  $1,600   $1,800   N/A  $1,800   $200  
TEs  $960   $1,080   0  $1,080   $120  
TXs  $480   $540   $120   $420   ($60) 
Ms  $160   $180   $4054   $140   ($20) 
Total  SH 
value 
$1,600   $1,800   N/A  $1,640   $40  
 
TEs benefit from the corporate-level savings. They enjoy an increase in 
their stock value proportional to their interest in the corporate-level tax saving 
(60% of total corporate tax savings of $200, or $120). Because they are tax 
exempt, they have no shareholder-level liability. The fact that TE hold the 
majority interest in ExCo assures that shareholders approve the proposed 
transaction. 
Both TXs and Ms, however, suffer a net detriment. In both cases, their 
personal tax liability triggered by the transaction exceeds their benefit from 
the corporate-level tax savings. Consider TXs, for example. TXs enjoy thirty 
percent (their proportional holding in ExCo) of the $200 savings, for a total 
of $60. However, they also suffer a shareholder-level tax liability of $120. 
Effectively, they are paying $120 in shareholder-level tax, for a $60 
corporate-level tax benefit. In total, they suffer a $60 of additional tax burden. 
Using similar calculations, Ms suffer a $40 tax increase. 
The result is not Pareto-optimal. TEs are better off, but all other 
shareholders are worse off. Even though the corporation saved $200 in taxes, 
the total after-tax value to shareholder only improves by $40. $160 of the 
corporate-level tax savings are lost to shareholder-level tax (and show up as 
government revenue). The transaction, however, is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
Shareholder value increased by $40 (from $1,600 with no planning, to $1,640 
with planning).  
The bottom line is that there is a value transfer of $60 from TXs, and $20 
from Ms, to TEs. The total tax-planning value to shareholders is $40. TEs, 
                                                 
53 For each group, the gross planning value is its proportional share of the corporate 
equity after taking into account the increase attributable to the tax plan. For example, TEs’ 
value is sixty percent of $1,800, or $1,080.   
54 Ms had a basis of $20. Their taxable gain is therefore $180 - $20 = $160. At twenty-
five percent tax rate, their tax liability 0.25 x $160 = $40. 
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however, receive a $120 benefit (more than the total benefit). This is only 
possible because TXs and Ms pay for the $80 difference ($60 from TXs + 
$20 from Ms). 
Note that revenue collection also suffers. The government is not able to 
recuperate all the revenue lost due to the tax plan. The government is only 
able to recapture $160 in shareholder-level taxes, after suffering a loss of 
$200 in corporate tax revenue. 
c. Example 2 – A Kaldor-Hicks Inefficient Result 
Assume the same facts as in example 1 except for the following 
modification: Instead of reducing taxable income by fifty percent, the tax-
planning scheme only reduces the corporate taxable income by twenty 
percent. Eighty percent of the corporate income (i.e., $800) remains taxable.  
ExCo’s end of year value will be: 
Vp = $1,000 + $800 x (1 – 0.4) + $200 = $1,680 
At 40% corporate tax rate, excluding $200 from income saves ExCo $80 
in taxes. The transaction still increases ExCo’s value. However, once we 
consider shareholder-level taxes, the overall tax burden increases. Table 3 
summarizes these outcomes. 
Table 3 














ExCo’s value  $1,600   $1,680   N/A  $1,680   $80  
TEs  $960   $1,008   0  $1,008   $48  
TXs  $480   $504   $11156   $393   ($87) 
Ms  $160   $168   $3757   $131   ($29) 
Total  SH 
value 
$1,600   $1,680   N/A  $1,532   ($68) 
 
As in the previous example, TEs receive a net financial benefit. Since TEs 
                                                 
55 For each group, the gross planning value is its proportional share of the corporate 
equity after taking into account the increase attributable to the tax plan. For example, TEs’ 
value is sixty percent of $1,680, or $1,008. 
56 TXs had a basis of $60 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $504 - $60 = 
$444. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax liability is 0.25 x $444 = $111. 
57 Ms had a basis of $20 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $168 - $20 = $148. 
At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax liability is 0.25 x $148 = $37. 
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hold the majority vote, they will be able to have the transaction approved. 
The striking difference compared with the previous example, however, is 
that the transaction is a net-loss overall. Shareholders’ aggregate tax burden 
is heavier than the corporate-level tax savings. This is a counterintuitive 
outcome. At the corporate level there are tax savings of $80. However, the 
combined tax cost to TXs ($111), and Ms ($37), exceeds the corporate level 
tax saving. As is shown in the table, ExCo’s shareholders are $68 worse off 
overall compared with the non-planning benchmark. In other words, even 
though the corporate tax plan saved corporate taxes, it destroyed value to 
shareholders. 
One might expect managers to prevent such transactions because they are 
inefficient to shareholders, and because managers themselves are worse off 
(by $29). However, as the next example shows, managers will be able to 
secure TEs’ cooperation to compensate managers for their personal tax cost. 
In this example, the government is better off because of the corporate tax-
reducing scheme. While the government suffers a revenue loss of $80 in 
corporate taxes, it more than compensated for it by collecting $116 in 
shareholder-level taxes.  
d. Example 3 – Tax Gross-Up Payments 
The transactions described in examples 1 and 2 are detrimental to Ms, but 
Ms are in a position to change that. Ms are in charge of drafting the 
transaction documents. Theoretically, they could require ExCo to indemnify 
Ms for any personal tax cost resulting from the transaction. Certain types of 
such “tax gross up” payments are common in practice.58 
Consider Example 2 above. In that case, the managers expect to incur a 
personal tax cost of $37. They can cause ExCo to reimburse them for this 
cost. The reimbursement payment, however, must be higher than $37. The 
reason is that any tax payment by ExCo on behalf of Ms, is itself taxable 
income to Ms.59 Thus, ExCo will have to pay Ms $37/(1- t) (where t is the 
managers’ individual tax rate) in order for the gross up to account for Ms 
increased tax liability. Assuming managers are taxed at twenty-five percent 
rate like other shareholders, the grossed-up amount is about $49.34. When 
Ms are charged with a twenty-five percent capital gains tax on such amount, 
they are left with $37 at hand, just enough to cover their personal tax loss.60 
                                                 
58 Walker, Another Critical Look, supra note 29. 
59 Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716, 729, (1929) (“The 
discharge by a third person of an obligation to [a person taxed] is equivalent to receipt by the 
person taxed”). 
60 Calculated as follows: $49.34 x (1 – 0.25) = $37. 
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$49.34, however, is actually too high for a gross-up payment. The reason 
is that Ms also enjoy an increase in their equity value because of the corporate 
tax savings. Recall that in Example 2 the tax-planning scheme saved $80 in 
taxes to the corporation. Ms, holding ten percent of the corporate stock, get a 
benefit of $8 as a result (ten percent of $80). However, we cannot simply 
reduce the amount of gross up payment by $8, because any increase in 
corporate assets (here, as a result of reducing the gross up payments), coveys, 
again, a partial benefit to Ms in their capacity as capital owners of the 
corporation. Using the Goal Seek function in Excel to solve for this cascading 
calculation results in a gross-up payment of about $42.96.   
After the dust settles, ExCo’s value is (where Vpi denotes value that 
includes management gross up):   
Vpi = $1,000 + $800 x (1 – 0.4) + $200 – 42.96 ≈ $1637.04 
Table 4 below summarizes the outcomes, taking into account the tax gross 
up payment:
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  Table 4 






















ExCo’s value  $1,600   $1,637.04   N/A  $1,637.04   $0      $37  
TEs  $960   $982.22   0  $982.22   $0   N/A  $22.22  
TXs  $480   $491.11   $107.7861   $383.33   $0   N/A  ($96.67) 
Ms  $160   $163.70   $35.9362   $127.78   $42.96   $10.7463   $0.00  
Total  SH 
value 
$1,600   $1,637.04   N/A  $1,493   N/A  N/A  ($74.44) 
                                                 
61 TXs had a basis of $60 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $491.11 - $60 = $403.11. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax 
liability is 0.25 x $403.11 = $107.78. 
62 Ms had a basis of $20 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $163.70 - $20 = $143.70. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax 
liability is 0.25 x $143.70 = $35.93. 
63 As explained above, the gross up payment is itself taxable income to Ms. See, supra note 59. For simplicity, assume that the tax rate on the 
gross up payment is also twenty-five percent. Ms’ tax liability resulting from the gross-up payment is 0.25 x $42.96 = $10.74.  
E
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Since the managers are now tax-indifferent in their capacity as 
shareholders, the transaction can move forward relying on TEs’ majority 
vote. In fact, Ms are probably happy to move forward with the transaction. If 
their compensation is linked to ExCo’s after-tax results, they will see an 
increase in compensation. TXs are in no position to prevent the transaction, 
even though it is detrimental to them. TEs would rationally support the 
transaction even though they are giving up a little bit of their tax benefit in 
order to gross-up managers. At the same time, they force TXs to carry some 
of the burden of the gross-up cost. This adds insult to injury, since for TXs 
the transaction is already a loss transaction. Also, note that the total loss was 
$68 in example 2, but is about $74.44 in example 3. The difference ($6.44) 
is the deadweight loss resulting from the gross up payment to management.  
Again, the transaction is potentially beneficial to the government. Here, 
the government loses $80 in corporate tax revenue ($200 x 40%). The 
government, however, collects more than that in shareholder taxes. The 
government collects $107.78 from TXs, and $46.67 from Ms ($35.93 in 
capital gains and $10.74 tax on the gross-up payment). In total, the 
government gains about $74.47 ($107.78 + $46.67 – $80).  
Conceptually, one can think of such transactions as a shift of the corporate 
tax burden to taxable shareholders. Tax-exempt shareholders benefit from the 
increase in corporate net value. Managers benefit because their compensation 
increases. To summarize, tax-exempt investors and corporate managers have 
every incentive to cooperate and approve STCTs that include gross-ups, at 
the expense of taxable investors. 
e. Adjusting the Examples to Account for Multiple Periods. 
It is easy to adjust the examples to account for multiple periods (though 
it is not necessary for purposes of understanding the generic argument). 
Consider, for example, TXs in example 2.64 Their current net tax detriment is 
-$87. However, in NPV terms, this detriment is overstated. Assume, for 
example, that TX choose to hold on to their stock after the transaction, and 
that ExCo’s earnings are always $1,000 a year. As long TXs hold on to the 
stock, they enjoy their proportional share of future corporate tax savings. 
Meaning, they enjoy the future benefit of thirty percent of $80 annual savings, 
or $24. On the other hand, this $24 value increase also carries with it a future 
tax burden of twenty-five percent on the increased stock value (the capital 
gains tax). In other words, there is a future annual benefit to TX of $24 x (1-
0.25) = $18.  
If, for example, the discount rate in the market is five percent, the NPV 
                                                 
64 Supra, at Part I.b. 
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of recuperating $18 next year is $18/1.05 = $17.14. This means that for a 
shareholder planning to sell the stock next year, the true NPV of the tax 
detriment in example 1 is -60 + 17.14 = -$42.86. The NPV of the tax saving 
two years from now is 18/(1.05)^2 = $16.32. Thus, for a taxable shareholder 
intending to hold the stock for two years, the NPV will be: -$60 + $17.14 + 
$16.32 = -$26.54. 
In other words, at some point taxable shareholders will recuperate their 
loss.65 This does not change the argument, though, for two reasons: First, in 
reality, corporate tax savings are likely significantly less dramatic than the 
savings in the examples. Corporations will rationally engage in tax planning 
to save a few percentage points of effective tax rates. This argument is even 
stronger after the recent reform, which significantly cut corporate tax rates. 
This means that corporate tax savings are likely less valuable than before the 
reform. With small corporate level savings, taxable investor would have to 
hold the stock for long periods to recoup their losses, if at all.66 Second, even 
if one assumes that at some point taxable shareholders recuperate the loss, 
this does not change the fact that an STCT takes away shareholders’ control 
of their own tax outcomes (possibly against their will). Consider, for 
example, a shareholder who planned to retire next year, and is suddenly hit 
with a huge unplanned tax bill because of an STCT. Such shareholder will 
have to change her retirement schedule to recuperate her loss (if possible) or 
retire and accept less-than-planned retirement money.    
  
II. STCTS AND THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE TAX AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There is a large body of literature on the relationship between taxation 
and corporate governance.67 In this part I survey relevant literature and 
                                                 
65 For taxable shareholders in Example 2 this will happen if they plan to hold the stock 
for about four years after the transaction, since the NPV of the tax corporate savings will be 
$63.83, result in NPV at the time of the transaction of -$60+$63.83=$3.83.   
66 For example, in inversions transactions, recent modeling suggests that some taxable 
investor lose on an NPV basis. See, Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20, at 228 (“We 
find that this upfront cost outweighs the future benefits for 19.5% of shareholders”). 
67 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 2; Arlen & Weiss, supra note 3; Kanda & Levmore, supra 
note 25; Steven A. Bank, Capital Lock-In, supra note 2, at 94 (suggesting that the corporate 
double tax is a governmental response to managers’ practice of locking-in capital within the 
corporation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1225 (2004) (arguing that the corporate tax was 
conceived “as a regulatory device to restrict managerial power”) [Hereinafter: Avi-Yonah, 
Corporations, Society, and the State]; Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, 
and the Rise of the Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002) (arguing that the 
double corporate tax system is a historical compromise aimed at appeasing corporate 
managers who objected the idea of tax on undistributed earnings).; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 53 (1990) 
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explain how the identification of STCTs as a distinct category of corporate 
transaction contribute to current academic discourse.  
a. Agency Cost as an Explanatory Factor in the Persistence of 
the Double-Tax Model  
Among academics, there is a widespread agreement that the double tax 
model of corporate income is flawed, and that a single tax model—integrating 
corporate and shareholder taxes—is better.68 Tax literature offers multiple 
models of integration, each with its own benefits and drawbacks.69 Multiple 
other countries implemented some form of integration.70 Nonetheless, the 
two-tier system survived in the United States for more than a century now71, 
and even endured the 2017 tax reform. Attempts to reform our corporate tax 
system to integrate corporate and shareholder taxes have failed.72  
Scholars have offered various explanations to the persistence of our 
double-tax system.73 Among others, scholars considered the possibility that 
agency costs hold some explanatory power. One oft-referred article is Arlen 
and Weiss’ Political Theory of Corporate Taxation.74 Arlen and Weiss argue 
that shareholders and managers have different tastes for tax breaks. 
Integration of corporate and individual tax, they argue, “confers a windfall 
on existing assets, thereby help existing shareholders”.75 The underlying 
assumption here is that when shareholders price their investments, they 
account for the double-tax. If the double-tax is replaced with integration (that 
is, a single tax), shareholders receive a windfall. 
                                                 
(arguing that the corporate income tax was originally enacted to regulate managerial power 
and abuse). For summaries of this voluminous literature see, e.g., Schizer, supra note 3; 
Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax and Corporate Governance: an Economic 
Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (Wolfgang Schön, ed., 2008); John R. 
Graham, Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review, 16 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1075 (2003).  
68 Doran, supra note 2, at 528 (“Both policy makers and academics generally agree that 
the double tax results in significant distortions of economic and business decisions and argue 
for its repeal”); Arlen & Wise, supra note 3, at 326 (The two-tier taxation is ‘unusual, unfair 
and inefficient’); Warren, supra note 2, at 798 (Concluding that the double tax system “is 
defective because otherwise equivalent cases receive substantially different treatment. The 
results are undesirable in terms of the potential effects on economic welfare, the complexity 
of the resulting distinctions and the unfairness of treating similar transactions differently”);  
69 For a survey of various models of corporate and shareholder-level tax integration see, 
REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
INCOME TAXATION LAW 143-46 (2011).  
70 Id., at 146-48. 
71 Doran, supra note 2, at 518-519.  
72 Id., at 521. 
73 For a survey of such literature see, Bank, Capital Lock-in, supra note 2, at 895-901.  
74 Arlen & Wise, supra note 3. 
75 Id., at 338. 
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Unlike shareholders, managers have little “to benefit from tax cuts that 
produce a windfall”.76Managers—who are “heavily dependent of the fortunes 
of the firms they manage”77—“gain from [tax breaks] for new investments.”78 
As such, managers lobby for tax breaks that encourage new investment (such 
as accelerated depreciation), but not for integration.79 Arlen and Weiss 
suggest that managers would not necessarily oppose integration, but will also 
not vigorously advocate for it.80 Unlike managers, shareholders face a 
collective action problem, and cannot effectively lobby for their preferred tax 
break.81 The essence of the argument is that shareholders’ tax preferences 
remain muted in corporate tax reform discourse. This difference between 
shareholders and managerial tax interests is the “key to explaining the failure 
of integration efforts”.82 
Arlen and Weiss agency-cost explanation was the subject of convincing 
criticism.83 Their theory suffers from several problematic assumptions, and 
ignores important practical and legal realities. For example, the idea that 
shareholders cannot mount a successful lobbying effort in support of their 
own tax interests seems questionable. Large institutional investors (many of 
which are tax exempt), dominate U.S. equity markets.84 Such investors do not 
face the same collective action problems as individual taxable shareholders, 
and can (and do) advance effective lobbying campaigns.85 
Another failure in Arlen and Weiss’ explanation is that—contrary to their 
assumption—there is a reason to expect that managers gain significantly from 
tax breaks that benefit existing capital. Recall that managers themselves are 
shareholders and hence would enjoy any “windfalls” of integration. In 
addition, tax breaks that reduce corporate-level tax liability in respect of 
                                                 
76 Id., at 338. 
77 Id., at 336. 
78 Id., at 341. 
79 Id., at 342. 
80 Id. at 327 (“[W]hile many managers support integration, they would rather devote 
corporate resources to lobbying for tax preferences such as ACRS and ITC, that encourage 
new investment”).  
81 Id., at 363 (“Shareholders typically are too dispersed to exert significant control over 
corporate investment decisions or to lobby congress directly”).  
82 Id., at 327. 
83 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 2, at 523 (Responding to Arlen and Weiss, concluding 
that “the persistence of the corporate double tax cannot be explained simply as a failure of 
managers to act in the interest of shareholders”). 
84 For 2013, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
estimated that about 60% of all equities traded on U.S. markets are owned by institutional 
investors. See Serdar Çelik and Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership 
Engagement, 2013 OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKETS TRENDS 93, 96 (2014). 
85 Doran documents several instances in which institutional shareholders had discernable 
effect on corporate tax reform proposals. See, Doran, supra note 2, at 581, 584. 
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existing investment, also benefit managers. If managers’ compensation 
increases with the price of the corporate shares, tax saving on returns 
generated by existing corporate investments (which is likely to boost share 
prices) enhances managers’ compensation.86 Thus, even under Arlen and 
Weiss’ framework, managers have a reason to lobby for tax breaks that confer 
windfall to existing investment. In fact, managers specifically design many 
STCTs to save potential future taxes on existing investment. For example, one 
of the main benefits of a corporate inversion transaction (discussed below) 87, 
is to save tax on past earnings held in offshore affiliates.  
It is also misguided to detach tax breaks that confer windfall to existing 
investment, from new investment opportunities. Any reduction in 
shareholder-level tax liabilities leaves more funds in private hands, making it 
easier to finance new investment.88 For example, even if integration is just a 
“windfall” to existing shareholders, it makes the cost of new equity 
investment lower, which in turn makes it cheaper for managers to raise new 
capital.  
Most importantly for purpose of my argument herein, however, is the fact 
that Arlen and Weiss fail to take into account corporate stakeholders’ tax 
heterogeneity.89 Arlen and Weiss seem to assume that shareholders are 
homogenous in their tax preferences, and that shareholders’ preferences are 
different from the homogenous preferences of managers. Michael Doran 
criticizes Arlen and Weiss precisely on this point.90 He correctly notes that 
different managers have different tax interests depending on the tax status of 
the firms they manage. Similarly, different shareholders have different tax 
preferences, depending on their personal tax status. Heterogeneous tax 
preferences leads different corporate agents to prefer different integration 
models. 
                                                 
86 For example, existing investment may produce a steady stream of income to the 
corporation from rents, interest or royalties. Reducing the tax rate on such income creates a 
windfall to the corporation. If managers’ compensation is tied to corporate performance, they 
share in that windfall. 
87 infra at Part III.b. 
88 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 167 (2005). (“Cutting taxes on dividends, all else equal, should raise 
share prices, lower companies’ costs of capital and raise corporate investment”). 
89 Different stakeholders may prefer different models of integration. For a discussion on 
shareholders’ heterogeneity in preferences for integration models see, Doran, supra note 2, 
at 547-563. 
90 Id., at 522-523 (“[Arlen and Weiss’] agency-cost explanation… does not adequately 
account for important points, including the substantial heterogeneity of interests that 
managers, shareholders, and other parties have with respect to the double tax or the 
differential effects that various integration models would have on managers, shareholders, 
and other parties”). 
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There is no reason to assume that all shareholders would want integration 
or that if they do, they would all want the same type of integration.91 Consider 
the following most “generic” models of integration: “Dividend deduction”, 
“dividend exemption”, and “imputation”. 
In a dividend deduction model, corporations receive corporate-level 
deduction for dividends paid to shareholders. The effect is to eliminate 
corporate tax on distributed profits, and generate a single level of tax at the 
shareholder-level. This is great for tax-exempt shareholders: corporate tax is 
eliminated, and the receipt of dividends is not taxed to them due to their tax-
exempt status. Dividend deduction effectively eliminates all tax burden on 
tax-exempt shareholders. Dividend deduction may also benefits taxable 
investors, because it eliminates corporate level tax (though the dividends 
themselves remain taxable).92 However, taxable shareholders may have a 
different interest than tax-exempts for the timing corporate distributions. Tax-
exempt shareholders would always benefit form a distribution, while taxable 
shareholder would only benefit if their personal tax cost is less than the 
corporate level tax savings. This depend on a taxable shareholder personal 
tax position at any given time. 
Tax-exempt shareholders may object to a dividend exemption model of 
integration. Under a dividend-exemption model, corporate income is taxed at 
the corporate level, but distributions to shareholders are exempt. This makes 
no tax-difference to tax-exempt shareholders who are not subject to tax on 
corporate distributions. However, taxable shareholders would very much 
benefit from such an exemption. Stated differently, under the current system 
tax-exempt shareholders have a significant competitive edge over taxable 
investors when pricing corporate stock.93 Under a dividend-exemption 
model, tax-exempt investors lose such advantage, and hence have a good 
reason to object to such model. 
Finally, under an imputation model, corporate income is subject to tax, 
but shareholders receive a credit for their proportional part in corporate-level 
tax liability, and use the credit to offset their own taxes.94 Corporate tax is 
                                                 
91 Id, at 546 (different shareholder-level tax circumstance create “different, and 
potentially inconsistent, interests among shareholders”). 
92 Thus, whether the deduction is beneficial depends on the rate differential between the 
investor’s personal taxes, and the corporate taxes saved.  
93 Tax-exempt investors can always outbid taxable investors for the same investment. 
For example, if a taxable investment generates ten percent annual return, but the tax rate is 
thirty percent, a taxable investor net return will be seven percent, and he will only be willing 
to offer a price reflecting such return. A tax-exempt investor can always offer a slightly 
higher price, because it expects to enjoy the full ten percent return.   
94 For example, assume that the corporate tax rate is 20%, and the individual tax rate is 
40%. A corporation earns $100, and pays tax of $20, leaving $80 of available dividend. 
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effectively an “advance” on shareholder tax. Taxable shareholders would 
obviously benefit from such a system. Tax-exempt shareholder will not. Tax-
exempt shareholders have no use of the credit, because they have no personal 
taxable income against which to apply the credit.   
Tax heterogeneity also affects managers’ incentives. There is no reason 
to assume that all (or most) managers have the same taste for integration, as 
suggested by Arlen and Weiss. For example, Doran argues that managers of 
low-taxed corporations “rationally should prefer a system of double taxation 
that imposes high relative tax rates on other corporations to a system of 
integration, even if the integrated system would reduce all corporate effective 
tax rates in absolute terms.”95 Conversely, “managers at high-tax 
corporations… should prefer a leveling of effective tax rates through 
integration to the continuation of uneven effective tax rates under the status 
quo.”96  
Doran concludes that it is wrong to attribute the survival corporate tax 
system “to the divergence of interests between managers (understood as a 
single group) and shareholders (understood as a single group)”.97 Instead, he 
attributes it “to the divergence of interests among managers, the divergence 
of interests among shareholders, and the divergence of interests among other 
parties affected by the double tax.”98 The bottom line is that different 
integration proposal will have different winners and losers, and to-date, 
Congress was unable to design an acceptable political compromise. 
The STCT frameworks adds another level to Doran’s criticism. Doran 
shows that by ignoring corporate stakeholder’s heterogeneity of tax 
preferences, Arlen and Wise misrepresent the rational interests of various 
agents in tax reform discourse. My addition is to show that tax heterogeneity 
also affects the interests of stakeholders in respect of on-going corporate 
operations. Under Arlen and Weiss’ framework, shareholders benefit from 
tax savings regardless if the saving is at the corporate or the shareholder level. 
What matters in their framework, is that there be a single, rather than double, 
tax. STCTs prove this assumption incorrect. Once we consider STCTs, it 
                                                 
Nonetheless, the shareholder dividend is grossed-up for the corporate tax paid, and the 
shareholder is treated as receiving $100 in taxable dividend. The shareholder’s tax liability 
is therefore $40 (forty percent of $100), but the shareholder also receives a credit for the 
corporate tax paid ($20). Thus, the shareholder only has to remit the remaining $20 to the 
tax authority. The total tax paid is forty percent, which represents a single level of tax paid 
at the shareholder’s personal rates: $20 are paid by the corporation, and $20 by the 
shareholder.   
95 Doran, supra note 2, at 541.  
96 Id., at 541-542. 
97 Id., at 523. 
98 Id. 
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becomes clear that it is sometimes rational for shareholders to object 
corporate-level tax reduction. Stated differently, a single tax model does not 
necessarily produce a lower overall tax burden for all shareholders. In 
STCTs, the elimination of corporate level tax, is sometimes translated to a 
higher (single-level) shareholders tax.  
b. Corporate Taxation as a Governance Instrument  
i. Corporate tax and shareholders’ heterogeneous tax 
preferences  
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore’s seminal paper99 suggests that the 
separate taxation of corporate entities mitigates agency costs. They start with 
the presumption that managers’ and shareholders have diverse tax 
interests.100 Kanda and Levmore recognize that shareholders themselves have 
diverging tax interests and are “therefore in occasional conflict with one 
another.”101 This is a source of a conflict of interest between managers who 
hold equity in the corporations they run, and other shareholders. In their 
capacity as equity holders, managers may prefer their own shareholder-level 
tax-interests to the tax-interests of other shareholders. Kanda and Levmore 
suggest that the double-tax model mitigates this problem, because it 
“’equalizes’ shareholders' preferences for corporate transactions even though 
shareholders are in diverse individual tax circumstances.”102 
In order to explain how such “equalization” works, Kanda & Levmore 
imagine an alternative system of “pass-through” taxation, “in which 
corporations are not separately taxed”103 but instead, “shareholders are taxed 
each year, at their respective individual rates, on their imputed shares of the 
firm's income.”104 This is, in fact, how taxation of partners in partnerships 
generally works under current law.105 Such pass-through model is another 
potential model of integration.106 In such a case, agency costs arise since the 
manager “will want to make corporate decisions that benefit managers’ own 
tax situation.”107 For example, the manager’s “self-interest is likely to involve 
retaining appreciated assets (inside the corporation) in order to postpone 
                                                 
99 Supra note 25. 
100 Id., at 229. (Our argument focuses on the fact that [managers'] individual tax rate will 
often be different from that of other shareholders, or principals. 
101 Id.  
102 Id., at 213. 
103 Id., at 229 
104 Id., at 229. 
105 I.R.C. §701 
106 Under a “pass-though” model, all entity-level tax attributes simply flow through to 
the equity owners, who pay tax on their share in the entity profits.  
107 Kanda, and Levmore, Supra note 25, at 230.  
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recognizing gain, when lower-taxed shareholders would prefer that the 
corporation sell these assets and perhaps invest in other assets.”108 
When the corporate entity and its shareholders are taxed separately, 
however, the tax interest of the shareholders and managers are aligned. This 
is so because “in-corporate” tax consequences presumably do not affect 
shareholder-level taxation. “By … taxing a corporation as a distinct entity, 
tax law causes all shareholders to agree (at least in tax terms) on timing 
questions. It is in [the manager’s] interest and in the interest of all the other 
shareholders for the corporation to be as profitable as possible regardless of 
their individual tax rates.”109 Under such a framework, everyone benefits 
from successful corporate-level tax planning (because the overall tax burden 
is reduced), regardless of each shareholder personal tax stance. 
However, Kanda & Levmore’s argument is only true if one assumes that 
entity-level taxation is in fact separate from shareholder taxation. This 
assumption does not always stand. In STCTs, “in-corporate” tax planning 
schemes directly affect shareholder-level tax liability. An STCT reintroduces 
the same agency problems Kanda and Levmore identify in the context of the 
pass-through model. Managers may prefer their own tax interests to the tax 
interest of other shareholders. The tax gross-up payment is one such example. 
This significantly narrows the breadth of Kanda and Levmore’s argument to 
non-STCT transactions. 
ii. Corporate tax as a monitoring instrument 
Some researchers suggest that the double-tax model enhances 
shareholders’ ability to monitor managers. Consider, for example, pyramidal 
ownership structures. Such structures are detrimental to corporate 
governance, because they are opaque and enable insiders to unbundle control 
from financial risk. 110 The double-tax model is a strong incentive against 
pyramidal ownership structures, because each inter-company payment along 
the corporate chain potentially creates an additional layer of tax burden. 
While many countries provide a relief from intercompany dividend taxation, 
such dividends remain at least partially taxable in the United States.111 This 
                                                 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Morck & Yueng, supra note 88, at 177. (“Numerous studies… attest to the 
importance of governance problems in pyramids, especially in countries that provide public 
shareholders with weak legal rights against corporate insiders”). 
111 IRC §243 allows a corporate recipient of a dividend to deduct seventy percent of the 
dividend received from another corporation (“dividend received deduction” or “DRD”). 
Functionally, this means that only thirty percent of the dividend is taxable to the recipient. 
The DRD amount is increased to eighty percent if the recipient holds at least twenty percent 
of the vote and value in the distribution corporation, and to a hundred percent (meaning, 
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fact likely plays a significant role in preventing pyramidal ownership 
structures in the United States, while such structures remain common 
elsewhere.112  
Pyramids, however, make it less likely that a corporate-level tax plan will 
be taxable to the ultimate shareholders. The reason is that pyramids distance 
the tax-outcomes of public shareholders at the top of the chain, from the tax 
consequences of the corporation at the bottom of the chain. It is easy to 
envision a corporate transaction that is also taxable to the corporate 
shareholder one level up the chain (because, for example, it creates a deemed 
sale by the shareholder). It is harder to imagine corporate transactions that 
affects the tax liabilities of shareholders all the way to the top of the chain of 
the pyramid (though it is possible). For a transaction to be an STCT in a 
pyramid – there must be a taxable event at each level of the pyramid all the 
way to the top. While the double-tax model discourages pyramidal 
ownership, it makes STCTs (and their associate agency problems) more 
likely. This is so because in the absence of pyramidal structures, STCTs are 
less costly to engage in. 
Ironically, one of the main agency problems of pyramids is the ability of 
“majority shareholders—often in collusion with directors—[to] divert 
company’s assets to themselves, departing from arm’s-length conditions in 
their contractual relationship with the company.”113 STCT enable exactly 
that: the ability of managers and tax-exempt shareholders to divert 
companies’ profits to themselves, against the interest of minority (taxable) 
shareholders.  
Another line of literature identifies corporate taxation as a potential 
instrument for monitoring managers. Marjory Kornhuaser, for example, 
argues that the introduction of separate taxation of corporate entities in 1909 
was a response to the corporate consolidation phenomenon at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and the ensuing increase in corporate influence.114 A key 
aspect of corporate tax as introduced at the time was that corporate tax 
information was public.115 The idea was to provide investors with 
                                                 
complete elimination of tax on the intercompany dividend), if the recipient holds at least 
eighty percent of the vote and value in the distributing corporation.   
112 Morck & Yueng, supra note 88, at 177 (“With its tax on intercorporate dividends, 
the United States has a highly exceptional corporate sector, almost devoid of pyramids… 
America’s intercorporate dividend taxation rules is probably a key, though largely 
unappreciated, reason for this exceptionalism”). 
113 Schön, supra note 5, at 60. 
114 Kornhauser, supra note 68, at 55-82 (describing the era of corporate consolidation, 
political responses and early attempts at corporate regulation). See, also, id, at 133 (“Concern 
about corporations focused on the large corporations and their monopoly of the market”). 
115 For a discussion of the various publicity features, see Id., at 113-133. 
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information that would assist them to supervise management.116 Similarly, 
Reuven Avi-Yonah suggest that that the corporate tax as originally enacted 
was “primarily viewed as a regulatory device to restrict managerial 
power.”117 The regulatory feature “was achieved most directly through the 
publicity feature of the tax”118 but also because tax had “the potential to 
regulate management directly by reducing corporate wealth and therefore 
restricting managerial power.”119 
This historical rational seems to be outdated, given that corporate tax 
information is no longer public.120 There is a healthy debate about whether 
corporate tax information should be public, and it is beyond the scope of this 
article to consider it.121 It is clear, however, that corporate tax privacy makes 
it harder for minority shareholders to monitor managers’ corporate tax 
decisions.122 STCTs exacerbate such negative effects: opaque corporate tax 
planning not only hinders shareholders ability to monitor managers, but may 
also result in a direct shareholder-level tax detriment.  
More importantly, STCTs demonstrate that in some instances, the 
availability of tax information has little effect on the ability of shareholders 
to regulate managers. The information about the tax detriment to taxable 
shareholders STCTs is freely available. Information about tax gross-up 
payments to managers is also disclosed. But there is little that taxable 
shareholders can do long as they are in minority. Tax exempt shareholders 
have every incentive to cooperate with managerial rent extraction, because 
they also benefit from STCTs.    
c. Double Taxation and Corporate Distribution Policies 
The double-tax model affects corporate financing structure and 
distribution policies in ways that exacerbate agency costs.123 It does so in two 
ways: First, it incentivizes managers to retain earnings. Second, it creates a 
                                                 
116 Id. 131 (“The regulations, therefore, required publicity of the returns of these 
corporations in order to provide potential investors the information needed to make informed 
decisions. In this respect the regulations became the forerunner of Securities and Exchange 
Commission reporting”). 
117 Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State, supra note 67, at 1225. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 I.R.C. §§ 6103 prescribes strong confidentiality protections on tax returns and return 
information.  
121 For an excellent recent discussion on corporate tax privacy, see, Joshua D. Blank, 
Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 NYU J. OF L. & BUS. 31 (2014). 
122 See, e.g., David. Kamin (moderator), Panel 2: Should Corporate Tax Returns be 
Public?, 11 NYU J. OF L. & BUS. 159 (2014). 
123 See, Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 67, at 27-29 (discussing the interaction 
between corporate financing choices, distribution policies, and corporate governance).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145
15-Mar-18] Law Review 31 
conflict among shareholders with regard to distribution policies.   
Consider the earning retention problem first. “Dividends mitigate agency 
costs by reducing the resources under management’s control.”124 Self-
interested managers may therefore prefer not to declare dividends, even if it 
is in the best interest of shareholders. Since dividends are taxable to 
shareholders, “managers could invoke [shareholder] tax as a pretext not to 
pay dividends”125 under the theory that shareholders would benefit from 
deferred tax liability. Thus, the double tax model may support managers 
retention of corporate earnings beyond an optimal level.126 There is empirical 
evidence suggesting that this happens in practice. 127 
Next, consider shareholder preferences for corporate distributions. Since 
different shareholders are in different tax positions, they may have diverging 
interests in such context.128 Tax-exempt shareholders would like distributions 
because they are not taxable to them yet generate liquidity. Taxable 
shareholders may or may not like distributions, depending on their particular 
tax situation.  
Kanda and Levmore recognize the agency problems associated with 
corporate distributions, but argue they are “less important” than the agency 
                                                 
124 Schizer, supra note 367, at ¶4.1.3.; Arlen and Weiss, supra note 3, at 352-356 
(discussing how the double-tax model may encourage some managers to retain earnings). 
Other commentators, however, suggest that management in U.S. corporations retained 
earnings even before the introduction of the corporate tax. See, Bank, Capital Lock-in, supra 
note 2, at 918 (the rise of retained corporate earnings “occurred prior to the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment and thus during a period in which the income tax could not have 
been a factor”). Instead, Bank suggests that the double tax model should be viewed as a 
response to the retained earnings problem, and not the other way around. Specifically, Bank 
argues that the double tax model is a political compromise between supporters of the pass-
through system (which would have taxed shareholders on a current basis), and supporters of 
taxation of retained corporate earnings (which corporate managers objected). See, Bank, id., 
946-947.     
125 Schizer, id. 
126 In practice, management incentives in such context are more nuanced. First, tax-
exempt shareholders have no potential upside from deferral, since they are not subject to tax 
on dividend. In respect of tax-exempt shareholders, manager cannot use dividend taxation as 
a pretextual excuse not to distribute dividends. Second, it is not clear that taxable shareholder 
always benefit from dividend deferral, because retained earnings presumably accumulate 
income themselves, thus increasing the tax-base to shareholders upon future distribution. If 
the after tax return on profits grows at the same rate both inside the firm and at the hand of 
shareholders, than deferral makes not difference in net-present-value terms. For a discussion, 
see Schizer, id.   
127 For a summary of empirical evidence of the effect of the double-tax model on 
corporate distribution policies, see, Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 28, at 27-29. 
128 See, Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 234-238 (discussing conflicts of interest in 
the context of corporate distribution policies). 
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problems associated with “in-corporate” decisions129 (such as whether to 
engaged in a particular transaction). Recall, that under Kanda & Levmore 
counter-factual scenario—where corporate transactions affect shareholder 
tax liability—managers have an incentive to structure “in-corporate” 
transaction to benefit the managers’ own tax-interests. This may result in 
inefficient transactions, for example, if a manager refrains from selling an 
asset because of manager’s self-tax-interest.130 The problem is less acute in 
the distribution context, they argue, because investors who are disappointed 
with corporate distribution policies can simply “sell… their shares.”131 In 
other words, investors have control on when to dispose of their stock, which 
allows them to alleviate any shareholder-level tax detriment resulting from 
corporate distribution policies. 
What Kanda & Levmore are referencing here is the “Clientele Theory”,132 
under which investors’ tax preferences affect their portfolio composition. For 
example, the clientele theory predicts that taxable investors will gravitate 
towards investments in growth companies, which rarely distribute dividends. 
This way, taxable investors retain control on the timing of gain recognition 
(since they will only recognize shareholder-level taxes upon disposition of 
their stock). Tax-exempt investors, on the other hand, would prefer 
investment in firms that regularly distribute dividends. The reason is that tax-
exempt investors enjoy the liquidity, but do not suffer any shareholder-level 
tax detriment that may be associate with the distribution.  
In the presence of STCTs, however, Kanda & Levmore argument loses 
its strength. Clientele effects are only a good remedy to shareholder-level tax 
detriment if shareholders can control of the timing of shareholder-level gain 
recognition. This is not the case in STCTs. In an STCT, managerial decision 
about “in-corporate” transactions, dictates the timing of shareholder-level 
gain recognition.133   
Investors may be able react to ongoing known corporate distribution 
policies, and choose to invest in companies with distribution policies that 
match the investors’ tax preferences. Unlike distribution policy, however, 
                                                 
129 Id., at 236. (“[T]here is a reason to think that the agency costs associated with 
dispositions, or with in-corporate decisions in-general, are greater and socially more 
important than those associated with distribution policies”). 
130 Id. (“Assets that would otherwise move to higher valued uses will not be so moved 
because of [the manager’s] self-interested behavior”). 
131 Id. 
132 See, MYRON S. SCHOLES ET. AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 142-145 (4th ed., 
2009) (discussing clientele effects).  
133 Of course, taxable shareholder may try to sell their stock before the transaction closes, 
but capital market hypothesis assumes that any costs to the shareholder will be reflected in 
the stock price as soon as the transaction is announced.  
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there is no (and cannot be) “STCT policy”. STCTs are “one-off” transactions 
that are not part of a standard corporate policy that shareholder can anticipate 
and react to ahead of time. There is no efficient way for taxable investors to 
anticipate STCTs before they are announced and calibrate their portfolio 
accordingly. 
There is an additional reason for which Kanda & Levmore believe that 
“in-corporate” inefficiency is worse than inefficiency resulting from 
distribution policies.134 If earnings are simply retained, there is no “real 
inefficiency” because “it is actual investment decisions rather than financing 
decisions that matter.”135 In this, Kanda & Levmore assume that in-corporate 
efficiency outweighs the shareholder-level inefficiency. As I demonstrated in 
Part I above, that is not necessarily the case in STCTs. It is plausible to expect 
that in some transactions the “in-corporate” tax benefit is outweighed by 
“shareholder-level” tax detriment. 
d. Corporate-level Tax Planning and Collateral Governance 
Effects 
While shareholders may benefit from reduced corporate tax liability, 
corporate tax planning may create corporate governance costs. “The basic 
intuition … is that tax avoidance demands complexity and obfuscation to 
prevent detection. These characteristics, in turn, can become a shield for 
managerial opportunism.”136  
The best-known example for such dynamics is probably the demise of the 
Enron Corporation. A Congressional report by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (JCT) notes: “as Enron’s management realized that tax motivated 
transactions could generate financial accounting benefits, Enron looked to its 
tax department to devise transactions that increased financial accounting 
income”.137 In designing its tax-motivated transactions, Enron “excelled at 
making complexity an ally. Many transactions used exceedingly complicated 
structures and were designed to provide tax benefits significantly into the 
future. For any person attempting to review the transaction, there would be 
                                                 
134 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 236. 
135 Id. 
136 Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 28, at 14. See, also, Schön, supra note 5, at 55 
(“Shareholders face a trade-off between the tax advantages which can be derived from 
complicated corporate group and financing structures on the one hand and the lack of 
management control resulting from these structures on the other hand”); Schizer, supra note 
3, at ¶4.3.5. (“Self-interested tax structuring is especially hard for shareholders to monitor, 
since tax rules are so esoteric”). 
137 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION 
ISSUES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (2003) [Hereinafter: JCT ENRON REPORT].  
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no easy way to understand its terms or purpose.”138 For example, at the end 
of 2001, Enron had about 1,300 foreign subsidiaries and other foreign 
affiliated entities.139 About eighty percent of Enron’s foreign affiliates “were 
inactive shells that did not hold and were not engaged in or associated with 
any ongoing business.”140 Under such circumstances, effective shareholder 
monitoring is exceedingly difficult. The JCT report identified multiple 
corporate governance deficiencies that were the result of Enron’s aggressive 
tax stances.141 
Scholars explored various types of corporate tax planning transactions 
and their potential negative governance effects.142 One oft-cited transaction 
type is the “corporation inversion”, in which a domestic corporation becomes 
foreign in order to escape U.S. taxes. Even if such transaction saves taxes, 
moving corporate residence to a foreign jurisdiction comes at a cost.143 Target 
jurisdictions may offer inferior shareholder protections compared with the 
ones offered by U.S. corporate and securities law.144 
                                                 
138 Id., at 23. 
139 Id., at 11. 
140 Id. 
141 For example, issues relating to compensation and retirement planning. Id., at 19 
(“Some of the issues examined by the Joint Committee staff with respect to Enron’s 
retirement plans and compensation arrangements raise nontax issues, such as issues of 
corporate governance and fiduciary responsibility); Issues relating to Employee loans. Id., at 
41 (“The loans raise Federal tax issues as well as corporate governance issues”); Issues 
relating to commodities transactions. Id., at 359 (“Enron’s reliance upon credit-linked notes 
in … transactions to effectively create credit capacity for additional commodity prepay 
transactions raises questions that are pertinent primarily to corporate governance and 
financial accounting”).    
142 See, e.g., Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and 
High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. OF FIN. ECON. 145, 176 (2006). (“[W]hile unexploited 
opportunities for tax sheltering with little or no risk of penalties could exist, increasing tax 
avoidance would create greater opportunities for managerial diversion. If managers cannot 
credibly commit to overlooking those opportunities, then shareholders could prefer that 
managers not engage in tax sheltering activity”); 
143 Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion through Inversion, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 837-51 (2015) (Discussing various collateral costs of inversion 
transactions).  
144 Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶5.1.1.(“Other jurisdictions may not offer comparable 
shareholder protections, especially tax havens like the Cayman Islands or Bermuda”); See, 
also, Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 
101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2015) (“Tax inversions can introduce material downstream 
legal risk, since they move the locus of corporate internal affairs out of conventional 
jurisprudential terrain and into the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is—by 
comparison—recondite and unfamiliar”); Gregory R. Day, Irrational Investors and the 
Corporate Inversions Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453, 457 (2016) (“From a director’s 
standpoint, inversions are quite appealing for reasons beyond reducing corporate taxes. 
Principally, a company’s leadership may structure an inversion to diminish management’s 
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The unique dynamics of STCTs worsens the governance problems 
associated with corporate tax planning, by burdening taxable shareholders 
(and the corporation – in case of gross-ups) with direct tax cost. Cost-benefits 
analyses of tax-planning transactions seems to consider corporate tax savings 
against transaction costs and potential governance costs. In an STCT, direct 
shareholders’ tax liability is an additional significant cost to account for. 
III. STCTS IN PRACTICE: INVERSIONS AND REIT SPINOFFS 
So far, I have identified STCTs as a distinct type of corporate transaction 
and explained the unique governance problems it presents. The purpose of 
this part is to shift the discussion from theory to practice. Again, given recent 
tax reform, the transaction described herein were designed and executed 
under the pre-reform law. There is no telling what types of corporate tax 
planning will take shape under the new law, but the generic point still stands: 
corporate tax planning may be detrimental to shareholders.   
Subpart A provides a brief legal background, explaining how—under the 
I.R.C.—corporate transactions may be taxable to shareholders. In subparts B 
and C, I explore two types of popular STCTs: corporate inversions and REIT 
spin-offs, and analyze both under the framework developed in the previous 
parts of the article. 
a. Shareholder-Taxable Corporate Transactions in General 
Generally, the I.R.C. prescribes that corporations and their shareholders 
are taxed separately. As taxpayers, corporations pay corporate income tax.145 
Shareholders are individually liable to tax on taxable corporate distributions, 
such as dividends.146 In addition, dispositions of corporate stock may trigger 
capital gains or losses.147 
The I.R.C., however, contains multiple instances in which corporate-level 
transaction may have a direct effect on shareholder-level tax liabilities. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to explore all such possible scenarios, but 
most fall into one of three categories: deemed distributions, deemed 
dispositions, and forced distributions. 
      
i. Deemed Distributions 
                                                 
duty to comply with a number of burdensome corporate regulations”); Mitchell A. Kane & 
Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1229 (2008) (exploring how various corporate tax-residence rule distort corporate 
charter competition).  
145 I.R.C. § 11. 
146 I.R.C. § 61. 
147 Id. 
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The I.R.C. sometimes prescribes that income earned by a corporation is 
deemed distributed to shareholders, even if no actual distribution took place. 
In such a case, shareholders must pay tax on such deemed distribution.148 
Deemed distributions apply in the context of several “anti-deferral” regimes. 
The purpose of such regimes is to prevent U.S. shareholders from deferring 
taxation by channeling income into controlled corporations.149 
For example, under Subpart F of the I.R.C.150, “Subpart F income” earned 
by “Controlled Foreign Corporations” (CFCs) is deemed distributed to “U.S. 
Shareholders” even if no distribution occurred.151 Generally, Subpart F 
income is income derived from passive activities.152 
Subpart F is the Congressional response to U.S. multinational 
corporations channeling income through foreign subsidiaries in low-tax 
jurisdictions.153 For example, in the absence of Subpart F, a U.S. 
multinational could reduce its U.S. tax liability by making a deductible 
payment (such as interest on inter-company debt) to a controlled foreign 
affiliate organized in a tax haven. In order to prevent such perceived abuse, 
the I.R.C. deems any “Subpart F income” earned by a CFC as immediately 
distributed to U.S. Shareholders. 
Before the recent tax reform, CFC’s income that was not Subpart F 
income was not taxable in the United States until repatriated to U.S. 
shareholders, usually in the form of a dividend. It would have been possible 
                                                 
148 This creates what is sometimes referred to as “phantom income”. Namely, a situation 
in which a taxpayer is required to pay taxes in respect of income that taxpayer has not yet 
relized.  
149 For a discussion of anti-deferral regimes in general, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX 
REGIME 125-149 (2007) (Discussing the legal development in the United States of various 
anti-deferral regimes) [hereinafter: INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW).  
150 “Subpart F” is the commonly used shorthand for Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part II, 
Subpart F of the I.R.C. It is codified in I.R.C. §§951-65.  
151 I.R.C. §951. A foreign corporation is a CFC if U.S. Shareholders own more than 50% 
of its vote or value. I.R.C. §957. A U.S. Shareholder is any U.S. person owning at least 10% 
of the vote of the CFC. I.R.C. §951.  
152 This includes, for example, income from dividends royalties, rents, interest and other 
typed of income not generated by passive participation. See, I.R.C. §§952-54 
153 In the absence of Subpart F, a U.S. shareholder could set up a wholly owned foreign 
corporation in a tax haven, and earn all income through that corporation, thus avoiding U.S. 
taxation. As originally conceived, the idea of Subpart F was to force U.S. shareholders to 
currently include in income any profits earned by a controlled foreign corporation. The 
eventual political compromise led to the current regime, under which shareholders currently 
include only passive income, while active CFC income is not included in shareholders’ 
income until repatriation to the United States. For a description of the Kennedy 
Administration’s proposal and the eventual political compromise, see Luke Wagner, Crisis 
and Deferral: How World Events Influence Subpart F, 152 TAX NOTES 1027 (Aug. 15, 2016). 
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to avoid tax on repatriated earnings, however, by having the CFC directly 
invest its non-Subpart F earnings in the United States. To prevent that, the 
I.R.C. deemed any CFC’s increase in net-investment in the United States also 
distributed to shareholders, and immediately taxable to them.154 The TCJA 
made this rule unnecessary, since under the new law CFC’s non-Subpart F 
income is not subject to tax upon repatriation (though the rule is relevant to 
inversion transactions I discuss below).  
Another anti-deferral regime is the Passive Foreign Investment Company 
(PFIC) regime. It has a similar logic to the CFC regime. The idea, again, is 
to prevent shareholders from stuffing income into foreign holding companies 
in order defer U.S. tax liability. This regime, however, targets individual 
shareholders. A PFIC is any foreign corporation if at least 75% of the gross 
income derived from passive income (the “income test”), or if at least 50% 
the corporation’s assets are passive-income-producing assets (the “assets 
test”).155 For that purpose, cash and cash equivalents are passive assets.156 
Thus, a public corporation that accumulates cash and cash equivalents may 
become a PFIC. Any U.S. person that holds stock in a PIFC is subject to one 
of three anti-deferral regimes. One of such regimes is the “Qualified Electing 
Fund” (QEF), under which PFIC gains are immediately taxable to 
shareholders, even if no corporate distribution was made.157 
The CFC and PFIC regimes are but two examples for regimes in which 
“in-corporate” operations directly affect shareholder-level tax liabilities. 
When a manager makes a decision to invest in certain types of assets, or earn 
certain types of income, the result may be immediate shareholder-level tax.  
ii. Deemed Dispositions 
Mergers and acquisition (knows in tax jargon as “reorganizations”),158 are 
another type of corporate event that may be taxable to shareholders.159 The 
                                                 
154 I.R.C. § 956, as in effect in 2017. 
155 I.R.C. §1297 
156 Notice 88-22, Passive Foreign Investment Company Provisions Operation of the 
Definitional Tests under Section 1296, 1988-11 I.R.B. 19 (Feb. 26, 1988) (concluding that 
“[c]ash and other current assets readily convertible into cash” are passive assets for PFIC 
qualification purposes).  
157 I.R.C. §§ 1293-95 
158 I.R.C. § 368. 
159 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS ¶ 94.1, 1997 WL 439996, 1 (“To the general practitioner, the term ordinarily 
connotes a financial rehabilitation of a bankrupt enterprise. To the tax lawyer, however, it 
embraces a much wider variety of corporate readjustments—most of which have the flavor 
of prosperity rather than depression. Section 368(a)(1) defines “reorganization” for tax 
purposes to include mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, acquisitions by one 
corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation, and changes in form or place of 
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tax treatment of corporate reorganizations is probably one of the most 
intricate areas of tax law. The guiding principle, however, is that certain 
reorganization that maintain continuity of the original ownership and 
business activity should not be taxable.160 The reason for this tax-favored 
treatment is to allow business-driven restructuring transactions to proceed 
unaffected by tax considerations. 
For example, in a statutory merger of two corporations, shareholders of 
the merged corporations replace their shares in the “old” corporation for 
shares in the newly merged corporation. Under general principles of tax law, 
the disposition of one asset (old stock), in consideration for another asset (the 
new stock), would be a taxable event. In the case of statutory mergers, 
however, I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(A) exempts such exchanges from tax if certain 
requirements are met. Multiple other code provisions prescribe various 
requirements for tax-free treatment for multiple types of reorganizations.161 
Some corporate acquisitions, however, are deemed to create enough of a 
difference compared with the structure before the transaction, to be taxable 
to shareholders. Thus, in many instances, a merger or a corporate acquisition 
is taxable to shareholders even if shareholders receive no cash in the 
transaction. The exchange by a shareholder of “old” stock for “new” stock is 
a taxable event. In such a case, the taxable gain is the difference between the 
shareholder’s basis in “old” stock, and the fair market value of “new” stock.  
Another example for deemed disposition comes up in the context of 
PFICs discussed above. Instead of making a QEF election and pay tax on 
deemed distributions,162 shareholders can elect to mark-to-market their stock 
at the end of each taxable year, and recognize any gains or losses as if they 
sold their stock on the last day of the year.163 Thus, if managers’ actions cause 
a corporation to become a PFIC, the result may be a deemed disposition to 
shareholders at the end of each taxable year.164   
To summarize, corporate transactions driven by “in-corporate” 
considerations may cause shareholders to be treated—for tax purposes—as if 
                                                 
organization.”) 
160 Id. (“Requisite to a reorganization under the Code are a continuity of the business 
enterprise...under the modified corporate form...and a continuity of interest...In order to 
exclude transactions not intended to be included, the specifications of the reorganization 
provisions of the law are precise”).  
161 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351, 355, 368. 
162 Supra note 157 and accompanying text.  
163 I.R.C. § 1296. 
164 The third anti-deferral alternative for shareholder in PFIC is not to pay tax until an 
actual corporation distribution. I.R.C. § 1291. In such a case, however, shareholders are 
liable to interest on the tax liability of any deferred amount. This would be the default rule if 
no QEF election is made, and not mark-to-market election is available. 
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they sold their stock, even though shareholders did not receive cash 
consideration, and did not actually dispose of any of their holdings.    
iii. Forced Distributions 
A final category of in-corporate decisions that may create tax liability for 
shareholders comes up in instances in which the I.R.C. requires that a 
corporation make distributions to its shareholders, thus generating 
shareholder-level tax liability. Forced distributions are generally required 
(among other qualifications) to qualify for certain tax-preferred corporate 
regimes. The most common examples are REITs (Real Estate Investment 
Trusts) and RICs (Regulated Investment Companies). 
Both REITs and RICs are classified as corporations for federal income 
tax purposes.165 Qualifying as a REIT or a RIC, however, allows the 
corporation to deduct dividend payments to shareholders.166 This effectively 
eliminates the double-tax, as the corporate profits are only taxes once – to the 
shareholders. The purposes of these preferred-tax regimes’ is to incentivize 
small and medium-size investors to pool resources and invest in specific asset 
categories. 
Both RIC and REITs have to meet certain income and assets tests167, as 
well as certain ownership thresholds tests168 in order to qualify for the 
preferred treatment. Most importantly, however, both must distribute at least 
90% of their profits each year to their shareholders.169 
Of course, shareholders know if a corporation is a REIT or a RIC before 
they decide to purchase its stock, and can therefore decide whether on-going 
taxable distributions match their individual tax preferences. However, in 
many instances regular “double-taxed” corporations may choose to turn 
themselves into REITs in the course of their lives (“REIT conversion 
transactions” or “REIT Spinoffs” are discussed below).170 In such a case, a 
taxable shareholder who already holds stock may suffer a tax cost associated 
with the conversion transaction. 
 
b. Corporate Inversions 
Over the past few decades, multiple U.S. multinationals engaged in 
inversion transactions.171 The purpose of a corporate inversion is to turn a 
                                                 
165 I.R.C. §851 (RICs); I.R.C. 856 (REITs). The result is a functional adoption of the 
dividend deduction model of corporate integration. 
166 I.R.C. §852 (RICs); I.R.C. 857 (REITs). 
167 The requirements are prescribed by I.R.C. §851 (RICs); I.R.C. 856 (REITs).  
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See discussion infra, at Part III.c. 
171 For a detailed description of the corporate inversion phenomenon, see, Omri Marian, 
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domestic corporation into a foreign corporation for tax purposes. Generally, 
in an inversion transaction a U.S. multinational corporation acquires a smaller 
foreign corporation through a merger in which the foreign corporation is the 
surviving entity. Thus, shareholders of the U.S. corporation maintain control 
of the foreign merged entity. The underlying rational is that by gaining 
foreign status, the corporation will be able to reduce its tax liability.172 The 
inversion transaction itself, however, is usually taxable to shareholders. 
Corporate inversions thus fit the STCT category of “forced dispositions” 
discussed above. As detailed in this Subpart, corporate inversions are a vivid 
representation of the unique governance problems created by STCTs. 
Inversion transactions have been very popular in recent years. A recent 
paper analyzing inversions counts sixty inversion transactions between 1993 
and 2015.173 At least forty-eight of such transactions took place on or after 
2002.174 Such transaction are not only popular in terms of absolute numbers, 
but also significant in dollar value. A recent study by the Congressional 
Budget Office found that in 2014 alone, “10 corporations—with assets 
totaling approximately $300 billion—announced that they were considering 
inversions”.175  
  
i. The Corporate Inversions Phenomenon  
In order to understand the structure of corporate inversion transactions 
and potential tax benefits, it is helpful to start with a brief background on U.S. 
tax law applicable to cross-border transactions. 
Under the law in effect before the TCJA, the United States generally 
imposed tax on its domestic corporations’ worldwide income.176 In order to 
prevent double taxation, domestic corporations receive a credit for foreign 
tax payments.177 Foreign corporations, however, generally only pay tax in the 
United States on income earned from sources within the United States.178 
Most other countries tax multinational corporations on a territorial 
basis.179 That is, only income earned within the geographical boundaries of 
                                                 
Home Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (2015) (describing 
corporate inversions). Hereinafter: Marian, Home Country Effects.  
172 Id., at 11-13 (discussing the reasons for which corporations invert). 
173 Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20. 
174 Nirupama Rao, Corporate Inversions and Economic Performance, NYU WAGNER 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2566429 (2015) (analyzing forty-eight inversions that happened since 
2002) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566429.  
175 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS 7 
(2017). 
176 I.R.C. §11(a), (d).  
177 I.R.C. §901. 
178 I.R.C. §§881, 882 
179 See Philip Dittmer, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT NO. 202: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
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the jurisdiction is subject to tax, regardless if the corporate taxpayer is foreign 
or domestic. With the TCJA, the United States adopted a similar approach.180 
Prior to the reform, some argued that U.S. multinationals are at a 
competitive disadvantage because they face taxation on worldwide earnings, 
while non-U.S. multinationals face territorial taxation.181 Such disadvantage 
was exacerbated by the fact that the United States used to have the highest 
corporate tax rate in the industrialized world.182 According to such 
competitiveness arguments, inversions were a response to these 
disadvantages.183 Other commentators, however, argue that U.S. 
multinationals faced no competitive disadvantage, due to multiple loopholes 
in the U.S. tax system that enable U.S. multinationals to legally reduce their 
tax rate.184 Rather, U.S. multinationals engaged in inversions simply because 
they could. It is rational for managers to engage in legal transactions that 
reduce corporate tax liabilities.185 
Notwithstanding the U.S. worldwide system of taxation, not all income 
of U.S. corporations was immediately taxable in the United States. Income 
earned by foreign subsidiaries was not taxed until repatriated back to the 
                                                 
ON TERRITORIAL TAXATION 3 (2012), available at 
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/ files/docs/sr202_0.pdf (concluding that 
“[o]verwhelmingly, developed economies are turning to the territorial approach”).  
180 TCJA, supra note 38, § 14101 (establishing a deduction for dividends received from 
foreign sources). 
181 Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the 
United States, 33 VA. TAX REV. 133, 164 (2012) (“Proponents of territoriality argue that the 
isolation of the United States in taxing its corporations on a worldwide basis puts U.S. MNCs 
at a competitive disadvantage”). 
182 See Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Tax Rates Comparisons and Policy 
Implications, R41743 CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2014) (“Advocates of cutting corporate tax rates 
frequently make their argument based on the higher statutory rate observed in the United 
States as compared with the rest of the world”).  
183 Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitiveness’ has Nothing to Do with It, 144 TAX NOTES 
1055, 1056 (September 1, 2014) (describing U.S. multinationals’ claim “that U.S. tax law 
has rendered them uncompetitive in international business, which in turn explains the sudden 
wave of inversion transactions”). 
184 Id., at 1056 (explaining that U.S. multinational face no competitive disadvantage due 
to their ability to engage in income shifting); See, also Marian, Home Country Effects, supra 
note 171171, at 10 (describing the competitiveness argument as “tenuous”); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah & Omri Marian, Inversions and Competitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-
Allergan, 41 INT'L TAX J. 39, 39 (2015) (suggesting that U.S. multinationals “engage in the 
inversions simply because they can and that inversions have nothing to do with maintaining 
a competitive edge”). 
185 Kleinbard, supra note 183, at 1055 (describing inversions as “economically rational 
deals”). I am making no judgment here on whether inversions are driven by competitiveness 
considerations. The assumption I am making here is that inversions are legal, and that they 
reduce the corporate-level tax liability. As such, management should—at the minimum—
consider inversions. 
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United States (usually in the form of a dividend), assuming the foreign 
corporation is not a CFC, or, if it is a CFC, the income is not Subpart F 
income.186  
A system of worldwide taxation that allows for tax-deferral created an 
incentive for U.S. multinationals to accumulate income in foreign 
subsidiaries. U.S. multinationals indeed used various “profits shifting” 
techniques to “stuff” income into foreign affiliates. Profit Shifting refers to 
the ability of the taxpayer to shift income—for tax reporting purposes—from 
a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction, without relocating the 
corresponding activity that generated the income.187 As long as the income 
remained in the foreign subsidiaries, it was not taxed to the U.S. parent. The 
magnitude of the problem was staggering. By one recent estimate, before the 
TCJA, U.S.-based multinational corporations held $2.6 trillion of untaxed (or 
lightly taxed) earnings in offshore affiliates.188      
Such a system creates an incentive to invert. There are three main benefits 
associated with an inversion: First, as a foreign corporation, an inverted 
corporation it subject to tax in the U.S. only on U.S.-source income, rather 
than on worldwide income. Second, an inverted corporation is able to easily 
access the piles of cash accumulated in offshore subsidiaries. If the offshore 
subsidiaries pay dividend to the now-foreign parent, the funds are never 
“repatriated” to the United States (but rather “repatriated” to the foreign 
parent), and no tax on is ever due. Finally, if the ultimate parent corporation 
is foreign, income shifting away from the United States becomes much easier. 
For example, it is highly unlikely that a foreign publicly traded corporation 
is a CFC (due to the dispersed ownership).189 Thus, income shifted to the 
foreign parent is never Subpart F income and will never be deemed 
repatriated to the United States. 
In order for U.S. corporations to enjoy the tax benefits of an inversion, 
they must first gain foreign tax status. Moving real operations out of the 
United States is costly, and such costs may undo the benefits of an 
                                                 
186 There are various legal ways for U.S. multinational to get around the CFC rules and 
there seem to be a consensus that the CFC regime is not an effective anti-deferral mechanism. 
See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption, 
59 EMORY L. J., 79, 93 (2009) (CFC “provisions do not reach substantial amounts of low-
taxed foreign source earnings.”); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. 
CFC Legislation after the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 186, 210 (2005) 
(concluding that “subpart F has fallen increasingly short of the goal of curbing tax haven 
sheltering”). 
187 For an authoritative discussion on the income-shifting phenomenon, see Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011) 
188 See House Ways & Means Committee Press Release, Joint Committee on Taxation 
Estimates Even More Foreign Earnings from U.S. Companies Stranded Overseas (Sept. 29, 
2016). 
189 See, supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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inversion.190 There was no need for U.S. multinationals, however, to move 
real activities in order to gain foreign tax status. Under the I.R.C., a 
corporation is tax-resident in the United States only if it is incorporated in the 
United States.191 Thus, in order to invert, all that a U.S. multinational has to 
do is to change its place of incorporation. 
Inversion transactions became popular in the 1980s. At that time, U.S. 
corporations engaged in inversions simply by changing their place of 
incorporation from the U.S. to tax havens such as Bermuda.192 For the most 
part, the change of incorporation was simply a formality. No change of 
ownership or operations followed. These inversions were known as “naked 
inversions”. Early transactions took advantage of certain code provisions 
granting tax-free treatments for reorganizations, so the inversions themselves 
were tax-free. The IRS responded with regulatory actions that made certain 
inversion taxable to shareholders, if at least 50% of the shareholders of the 
“pre-inversion” domestic corporation remained shareholders of the new 
foreign-incorporated corporation.193 In such circumstances, shareholders are 
treated as is if they dispose their stock in the “old” domestic corporation in a 
taxable exchange, and receive in return stock of the “new” foreign 
corporation. 
If the inversion is taxable, the tax burden on shareholders depends on their 
basis in their shares, their holding period in their shares, and their level of 
income. As explained above, taxable gain on the disposition of capital assets 
is the difference between the fair market value at the time of disposition and 
taxpayer’s basis.194 The lower the basis, the higher the taxable gain is. 
The holding period in the shares determines the tax rate applicable to 
gain. If an asset is held for a period longer than a year, then upon disposition, 
the gain is taxed at preferred long-term capital gains (LTCG) rates.195 The 
I.R.C. prescribes a progressive rate for LTCG, depending on the taxpayer’s 
income. Currently, the highest LTCG rate is twenty percent.196 In addition to 
the capital gains tax, investors who earn income above certain thresholds are 
                                                 
190 Marian, Home Country Effects, supra note 171, at 4 (“when the dislocation of real 
economic attributes is necessary in order to [invert], tax savings may not justify the cost of 
such dislocation”). 
191 I.R.C. §7701(a)(4). This formal rule is quite exceptional. Most other countries 
employ substantive rules to determine corporate residence. See, Omri Marian, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1613, 1657-1658 (2013) (describing U.S. exceptionalism in adopting a formal 
corporate tax-residence test). 
192 Marian, Home Country Effects, supra note 171, at 7-8 (describing the “first wave” of 
corporate inversions). 
193 Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c). 
194 I.R.C. §1001. For most taxpayers corporate stock are classified as capital assets. 
Stock in the hands of dealers and traders in securities are likely to be classified as inventory.  
195 I.R.C. §1222(3). 
196 I.R.C. §1(h)(1)(D). 
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also subject to 3.8% tax on investment income.197 Thus, shareholders who 
have held the stock for long periods may be subject to a total federal tax rate 
of 23.8% on their “gain” from an inversion transaction, even though they may 
have realized nothing. Moreover, the tax burden is higher once state and local 
taxes are considered. 
If the shareholders had held the stock for a period of a year or less, the 
applicable rates will be short-term capital gains (STCG) rates.198 STCG rates 
are generally the taxpayer’s marginal bracket rates, which—depending on the 
taxpayer income—were be as high as 39.6% before the TCJA (and 37% after 
the TCJA). 199 Adding the 3.8% investment tax on top means that some 
investors may see their “gain” taxed at a rate of 43.4%.      
Notwithstanding the regulatory changes that made inversions taxable to 
shareholders, inversions remained popular well into the early 2000s. These 
transactions, however, received unfavorable public attention.200 Congress 
finally responded in 2004, by enacting the “anti-inversion” rules, codified in 
I.R.C. sections 7874 and 4985.201 Section 7874 aims at the corporate level, 
while section 4985 targets managers.  
Section 7874 denies the benefits of an inversion to the corporation itself. 
Specifically, Section 7874 creates two thresholds for ownership 
“continuation” that determine the tax treatment of an inverted corporation. If 
at least eighty percent of the shareholders (by vote or value) of the new 
foreign corporation are shareholders of the old domestic corporation, the 
foreign corporation is treated as “domestic” for tax purposes 
(notwithstanding its foreign incorporation).202 If sixty percent of the 
shareholders of the new “foreign” corporation (but less than eighty percent) 
were shareholders of the old corporation, then the inverted corporation is 
unfavorably taxed in the U.S. for a period of ten years.203 An exception 
prescribes that if the new inverted corporation has “substantial business 
activity” in the foreign jurisdiction, Section 7874 does not apply.204 The logic 
is not to penalize transactions that are driven by substantive business 
                                                 
197 I.R.C. §1411(a). 
198 I.R.C. §1222(1). 
199 I.R.C. §1(a)-(d). 
200 Hale E. Sheppard, Flight or Fight of U.S.-Based Multinational Business: Analyzing 
the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 551, 557–58 (2003) (describing how corporate inversions were perceived by 
media and policy makers in the early 2000s). 
201 P.L. 108-357 2004 (American Jobs Creation Act of 2004), §§ 801(a), 802(a).  
202 I.R.C. § 7874(b). 
203 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B). 
204 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii). The “substantial business activity” threshold is generally 
met if at least twenty five percent of the assets, income and employees of the foreign 
corporations are located in the foreign jurisdiction. Treas. Reg. 1.7874-3. 
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considerations. 
While IRC 7874 successfully shut down “naked inversions”, other types 
of inversions transactions continued. After the enactment of Section 7874, 
U.S. multinationals engaged in inversions by merging with much smaller 
foreign corporate targets, but just large enough to avoid the sixty or eighty 
percent thresholds. Such transactions are almost always taxable to 
shareholders, because shareholders of the inverted corporation wish to 
maintain control of the merged entity. As a result, the transactions cross the 
fifty-percent ownership threshold that makes the transactions taxable.205 In 
response to this more recent wave of inversions, Treasury had issued three 
different sets of intricate guidance and regulations aimed at preventing 
inversions,206 with some success.207     
The other Congressional response to inversions—Section 4985—
discourage inversions by imposing an excise tax on managers. As noted, in 
most inversion transactions shareholders are required to recognize gain as if 
they sold their share of the inverted corporation in exchange for shares of the 
“new” foreign entity. Managers may hold shares in the corporation they 
manage, and thus suffer the shareholder-level tax like other shareholders. 
Managers, however, may hold substantial part of their performance-based 
compensation not in stock, but in other types of equity derivatives such as 
stock options. Many such compensatory instruments are not taxable in an 
inversion (or in other corporate mergers for that matter).208 In enacting 
Section 4985, Congress recognized this fact, expressing concern that “while 
shareholders are generally required to recognize gain upon stock inversion 
transactions, executives holding stock options and certain stock-based 
compensation are not taxed upon such transactions.”209 To address this 
problem, section 4985 imposes excise tax on executives’ stock-based 
                                                 
205 See, supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
206 Notice 2014-52, Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, 2014-42 
I.R.B. 712 (Sep. 22, 2014); Notice 2015-79, Additional Rules Regarding Inversions and 
Related Transactions, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (Dec. 2, 2015); T.D. 9790, 81 F.R. 72858-72984 
(Oct. 21, 2016) (promulgating regulations to deny certain tax benefits of inversion 
transactions). 
207 Andrew Velrade & Zoe Sagalow, As Inversion Dries Up, FDI Fell in 2016, TAX 
NOTES INT’L (Jul. 24, 2017) (Crediting the Obama Administration’s regulatory guidance 
with stopping several planned inversion transactions).  
208 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the tax consequences of equity-based 
compensation. Many types of such compensation, however, are not treated as deemed 
disposed equity in an inversion. Even if it is, such compensatory instruments are frequently 
drafted to allow management significant control of the timing of taxable gain recognition. 
For a discussion of tax planning advantages of certain types of performance-based executive 
pay, see, David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating 
Performance-Based Executive Pay, 1 J. OF L. FIN. & ACC’ING 395 (2016).  
209 H.R. REP. 108-548(I), 246. 
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compensation.210 Generally, the tax is imposed a rate of 15% on gross value 
of equity-based compensation of top executives.211 The executives are 
individually liable for the tax.212 The idea is to make sure that an inversion 
transaction is taxable to managers, forcing them to internalize shareholder-
level tax cost associated with the inversion. Section 4985 piggybacks off the 
Section 7874 thresholds. That is, the excise tax is only applicable if 
shareholders of the pre-inversion corporation own at least sixty percent of the 
inverted corporation.213 Thus, it is theoretically possible to structure 
inversions that are taxable to shareholders but not to managers. This will 
happen if the transaction pass the fifty-percent ownership threshold (and 
hence taxable to shareholders) but not the sixty percent threshold (and hence 
does not trigger the excise tax on managers). 
      
ii. Corporate Inversions as STCTs 
Inversion transactions present an obvious case of the governance 
problems associated with STCTs. For example, when Medtronic announced 
its plan to invert by merging with Irish-based Covidien (itself an inverted 
corporation), the board—in recommending the transaction for shareholders’ 
approval—noted that “the combined company’s effective tax rate will be 
reduced by about one to two percentage points compared with the companies’ 
estimated blended rate.”214 While a two-percentage point reduction in 
effective tax rate is a desirable corporate-level outcome, the transaction was 
taxable to shareholders.215 The Medtronic board was aware of this fact, noting 
in the registration statement “the merger is expected to be taxable for U.S. 
federal income tax purposes to the Medtronic shareholders, which could 
particularly affect long-term Medtronic shareholders with a low basis.”216 
                                                 
210 I.R.C. § 4985(a). 
211 As of Jan. 1, 2018, the § 4985 excise tax is imposed at a rate of 20%. See, TCJA 
supra note 38, § 13064.  
212 I.R.C. §4985(b). At the time of the enactment the fifteen percent rate was equivalent 
to the rate imposed on long term capital gains, which would be the rate faced by shareholders 
who have held their stock in the corporation for a period longer than a year. The intent was 
to make the rate imposed on managers equivalent to the rate imposed on shareholders. Since 
then, however, the long-term capital gains tax rate has increased to twenty percent. See, I.R.C 
1(h)(1). Congress, however, did not amend Section 4985 to maintain the parity between 
shareholders and managers. See, Walker, Another Critical Look, supra note 30, at fn. 9.  
213 I.R.C. §4985(c). 
214 Medtronic Holdings Limited, Registration Statement (Form S-4/A) 93 (Nov. 20, 
2014). Hereinafter: Medtronic Registration Statement.  
215 Id., at 24 (“For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the receipt of New Medtronic 
ordinary shares and cash in lieu of fractional New Medtronic ordinary shares in exchange for 
Medtronic common shares pursuant to the merger will be a taxable transaction”). 
216 Id., at 94. 
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An expected corporate-level tax savings of “one to two percent” 
compared with shareholder-level tax as high as 23.8%,217 suggests that some 
taxable shareholders may have suffered a net loss. Indeed, shortly after the 
transaction, minority taxable shareholders filed a class action against 
Medtronic, arguing, among others, that shareholders lost value due to the fact 
they were required to pay capital gains taxes in the inversion.218 
Shareholders made similar claims in a class action filed after Johnson 
Controls inverted by merging Tyco (Tyco itself was also an inverted 
corporation). In that case, some of the plaintiffs were Jonson Control’s 
retirees who received stock as an incentive pay.219 These retirees had a very 
low basis in the stock, which caused most of their stock value to be subject 
to tax in the inversion. The plaintiffs alleged that—taking into account state 
and local taxes—the resulting tax burden was “more than a third” of their 
value of their Jonson Controls stock.220 
Nonetheless, shareholders approved both the Johnson Controls and 
Medtronic inversions. There is no surprise here. It is reasonable to assume 
that tax-exempt shareholders owned the majority shares in both cases.221 For 
tax-exempt shareholders, the inversion is always wealth-increasing, so they 
will rationally vote to approve the inversion. The plaintiffs in the Jonson 
Controls class action specifically noted the conflict of interest between 
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders.222 
As evident from the Johnson Controls and the Medtronic shareholders 
suits, inversions “[present] a dilemma in that difference in the personal tax 
statuses of shareholders can lead to disagreement over the optimal corporate 
policy.”223 In a recent study, Babkin, Glover, & Levine empirically analyze 
                                                 
217 Shareholders with low basis likely have held the shares for a period longer than a 
year, so long term capital gains rates (rather than short term capital gains rates) are likely 
applicable. 
218 In re Medtronic, supra note 21, at 410 (Minn. 2017) (”The allegations of the 
Amended Complaint explain that the shareholders are harmed because the tax liability is 
imposed on them solely in their status as shareholders. Medtronic itself did not incur a 
capital-gains tax liability on the transaction, and therefore could not recover for the injury 
caused by this alleged harm… [T]he court of appeals correctly held that claims asserting this 
harm are direct”). 
 
219Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶ 138. (“Defendants knew its 
employees and retirees had little or no basis--i.e., large gains--because those employees and 
retirees bought their stock from JCI”). Hereinafter:  
220 Id., at ¶ 101 
221 See, supra note 19 and accompanying discussion. 
222 Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶100 (“While the deal's expected tax 
avoidance opportunities will, if realized, benefit JC plc and its non-taxpaying shareholders… 
that benefit will not be shared by the Minority Taxpaying JCI Shareholders”);  
223 Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20, at 228. 
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sixty inversion transactions, and find that “the aggregate effect [of inversions] 
across all shareholders (taxable and tax-exempt) is a 3.0% increase in 
value.”224 However, “[f]or an investor with a holding period greater than 3 
years, half of the inversions… result in a negative after-tax return.”225 For a 
simulated California-based high-net-worth taxable investor, Babkin, Glover, 
& Levine find that—after taking into account local taxes—an inversion 
results in a 20.6% loss of value, on average.226  
Babkin, Glover, & Levine study shows that inversions are usually not 
Pareto-optimal. This suggests that “an inversion results in a wealth transfer 
between shareholders.”227 While they do find inversions to be efficient 
overall, it is plausible that some inversion transactions are inefficient across 
shareholders (meaning, the value lost to taxable shareholders outweighs the 
gain to tax-exempt shareholders). This is a reasonable assumption, because 
Babkin, Glover, & Levine finding of 3.0% aggregate value increase is an 
average for all transactions they report. Such a low average benefit suggests 
that it is possible that outlier transactions result in an overall loss for 
shareholders. There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that this may 
be the case. For example, market reaction to inversion announcements has 
been mixed, with some corporations losing value after inversions.228 Since 
inversions save corporate-level taxes, one would expect a positive market 
reaction to inversion announcements. The mixed reaction suggests that 
corporate tax savings are potentially offset by other costs. One such cost may 
be shareholder-level taxes. If taxable shareholders own a large enough 
percentage of the inverted corporation, one can envision a plausible scenario 
under which shareholder-level tax cost is higher than corporate-level tax 
savings. 
Another cost that may undo the tax-benefit, is the corporate governance 
cost. For example, Cortes et. al. empirical analysis of governance 
mechanisms in inverted corporations find that “[f]irms that invert award 
executive pay that is less sensitive to stock prices, have greater protection 
from hostile takeovers, higher bid-ask spread and lower institutional 
ownership.”229 This suggests, they argue, that corporate governance suffers 
after an inversion.  
                                                 
224 Id., at 1. 
225 Id. 
226 Id., at 24. 
227 Id., at 25. 
228 Rao, supra note 174, at 13. 
229 Felipe Cortes, Armando Gomes & Radhakrishnan Gopalan, The Effect of Inversions 
on Corporate Governance 5 (2016). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481345; See also, Day, 
supra note, 144, at 458 (2016) (Noting that in inversions “shareholders vote in favor of--and 
thus authorize--the very transactions that limit their ability to acquire information and 
enforce other shareholder rights”).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145
15-Mar-18] Law Review 49 
Inversions also create a unique governance problem relating to 
managerial incentives. As noted, one Congressional response to the inversion 
phenomenon was to impose an excise tax on top executives in inverted 
corporations, in order to align executives’ tax-interest with the interest of 
taxable shareholders.230 Management response, however, was to structure 
transactions to include management tax “gross-up” payments.231 For 
example, the Medtronic inversion transaction included a “gross-up payment 
to each director and executive officer of Medtronic with respect to any excise 
taxes that may be imposed pursuant to Section 4985 of the Code”232, for a 
total cost of $72 million.233 It is rational for tax-exempt shareholders to agree 
to such additional cost. Medtronic registration statement estimated the tax 
savings from the transaction at about one to two percent reduction in effective 
rate. For 2014, Medtronic reported $780 million in tax payments. A two 
percent reduction would result in an immediate tax saving of $15.6 million. 
It will only take a few years for the corporate tax savings to outweigh the 
immediate cost of the gross-up. Shareholders in the Medtronic lawsuit 
alleged specific harm because of such gross-up payment, which was not 
available to all other shareholders.234 
The Johnson Controls transaction offers an interesting twist to the 
problem of managerial rent extraction in STCTs. In that case—some 
shareholders claim—instead of having the corporation gross-up managers, 
managers structured the transaction to avoid the excise tax altogether. Recall, 
that the excise tax is applicable to the extent that Section 7874 is applicable, 
meaning, if the transaction crosses the sixty-percent continuity of ownership 
threshold. The Jonson Control’s/Tyco inversion was a reverse acquisition, in 
which Tyco formally acquired Johnson Controls for a combination of cash 
and stock. After the transaction, former shareholders of Johnson Controls 
held fifty-six percent of the merged corporation, just below the sixty percent 
threshold.235 Thus, while the transaction was a taxable to shareholders, it did 
not qualify as an “inversion” for purposes of the Section 4985 excise tax. 
Shareholders in the Johnson Controls litigation argued that the management 
achieved the “below-sixty” threshold by undervaluing Johnson Controls’ 
                                                 
230 See, supra notes 194-199 and accompanying discussion. 
231 Ajay Gupta, News Analysis: Grossing Up an Inversion Tax, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 
806 (Sep. 8, 2014) “Grossing up [managers for] the section 4985 excise tax appears to be the 
norm in inversion transactions.”  
232 Medtronic Registration Statement, supra note 214, at 22. 
233 Id. 
234 Supra note 218. 
235 Tyco International PLC, Registration Statement (Form S-4) 1 (Jul. 1, 2016) “After 
consummation of the merger, Johnson Controls shareholders and Tyco shareholders are 
expected to own approximately 56% and 44%, respectively, of the issued and outstanding 
ordinary shares of the combined company”). 
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stock, and by forcing shareholders to receive a partial cash payment for their 
stock.236 A higher valuation that included no cash compensation would have 
required that Johnson Controls shareholders receive a higher share of the 
merged entity’s equity, thus potentially crossing the sixty percent threshold. 
The avoidance of the excise tax, shareholders argued, “was accomplished by 
the improper dilution of [Johnson Controls] shareholders' equity interest.”237 
At this time, both the Johnson Controls and the Medtronic inversions are 
still being litigated. Other inversion transactions also resulted in lawsuits 
relating to shareholder-level tax cost.238 Regardless of what the outcomes 
may be, ongoing inversion litigation vividly demonstrate the unique 
governance challenges of STCTs. 
 
c. REIT Spinoffs and REIT Conversions 
REIT spinoffs transactions (and the conceptually similar REIT 
conversion transactions),239 became a common tax-reducing scheme in the 
early 2000s.240 REIT spinoffs received popular and academic attention.241 
Many viewed such transactions as an abusive form of corporate tax 
planning,242 and in 2015 Congress eventually intervened to prevent such 
transactions.243 Commentators, however, have given little attention to the 
                                                 
236 Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶ 13 (“The under-60% ownership was 
accomplished by JCplc's cash payment of $3.86 billion to JCI shareholders in lieu of JCplc 
stock--i.e., JCI/JCplc forced JCI shareholders to sell to it $3.86 billion (approximately 17%) 
of JCI shares at a substantial discount … and by using the same steeply discounted value … 
to determine the exchange ratio of JCI shares for JCplc shares…”). 
237 Id., at ¶7.  
238 See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Steamfitters Local 
449 Pension Plan v. Eaton Corp. PLC., 2016 WL 3963518 (S.D.N.Y.) (alleging that as a 
result of an inversion transaction, a previously announced tax-free spinoff will become 
taxable to shareholders). 
239 Borden, for example, refers to REIT conversions as the “cousin” for REIT spinoffs. 
See, Borden, supra note 20, at 529.  
240 Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 32, at 442-443 (describing 2001 changes in IRS 
practices that made REIT spinoffs possible); Martin A. Sullivan, The Revenue Costs of 
Nontraditional REITs, 144 TAX NOTES 1103 (Sep. 8, 2014) (examining twenty REIT spinoff 
and conversion transactions between 1999 and 2015). 
241 See, e.g., Id.; Borden, supra note 20; Liz Moyer, R.E.I.T. Spinoffs in Washington’s Cross 
Hairs, N.Y. Times (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/dealbook/reit-spinoffs-in-washingtons-
cross-hairs.html?_r=1; Liz Hoffman, IRS Raises Red Flag on Real-Estate Spinoffs, Wall St. 
J. (Sep. 15, 2015, 7:16 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-raises-red-flag-on-real-estate-
spinoffs-1442359003.  
242 Borden, supra note 20, at 529-30 (describing the negative attention to REIT spinoff 
and conversion transactions). 
243 P.L. 114-113, Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 §311(a) (2015), 
codified in I.R.C. § 355(h) (Severely restricting tax-free treatment for REIT spinoff 
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unique governance issues arising in REIT spinoffs. REIT spinoffs turn a 
regular corporation—the income of which is subject to double taxation—into 
a corporation the income of which is taxed only once. However, the single 
tax is achieved through a “forced distribution” regime.244 As a result, 
shareholders pay a personal tax cost for a corporate-level tax benefit. It is not 
always clear that that the corporate tax savings outweigh the shareholder tax 
costs. 
i. Background: The Tax Benefits of REIT Spinoffs 
REITs are collective investment vehicles “through which small investors 
can pool their resources in order to invest in real estate and mortgages on real 
estate”.245 REITs are corporations for tax purposes. Unlike regular 
corporations, REITs receive a deduction for dividends paid to investors.246  
The I.R.C. prescribes multiple intricate requirements for REIT 
qualifications, aimed to assure that they functions as a pooled real-estate 
investment vehicle.247 For example, at least 75 percent of a REIT’s gross 
income must be from passive real-estate related payments (such as rents, or 
disposition of real property at a gain).248 In addition, at least 75 percent of the 
value of a REIT’s total assets must be attributable to real estate assets, cash 
and cash items.249 The most important qualifying requirement for our purpose 
is that a REIT must distribute ninety percent of its profits each year.250 Since 
REIT dividends are deductible, this requirement functionally assures that tax 
at the corporate level is eliminated (or almost completely eliminated). 
The elimination of the corporate level tax, however, comes at a cost: 
shareholders relinquish control on the timing of gain recognition.251 In the 
case of regular corporations, shareholders can choose to invest in 
corporations with a policy of minimum dividend distribution, and thus defer 
gain recognition until disposition of the stock. REITs, however, must 
distributed all (or most) of their profits each year.252 Shareholders must 
therefore recognize gain on dividends received and pay tax. In addition, 
unlike dividends distributed by “regular” corporations, most REIT dividends 
                                                 
transactions, by making the spinoff transaction a taxable transaction).  
244 See, discussion supra at Part III.a.iii.  
245 David F. Levy, Nickolas P. Gianou & Kevin M. Jones, Modern REITs and the 
Corporate Tax: Thoughts on the Scope of the Corporate Tax and Rationalizing Our System 
of Taxing Collective Investment Vehicles, TAXES—THE TAX MAG. 217, 219 (Mar. 2016). 
246 I.R.C. § 857. 
247 I.R.C. § 856 
248 I.R.C. § 856(c)(3) 
249 I.R.C. § 856(c)(4) 
250 I.R.C. § 857(a) 
251 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 246 (“The requirement of immediate 
distribution of income works to deny control over the timing of taxes”). 
252 This requirement excludes net capital gains. I.R.C. § 857(a).  
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do not qualify for long-term capital gains rates.253 This means that most REIT 
dividends are taxed at the shareholder’s marginal tax rate. As explained 
above,254 the investor-level tax rate (before the TCJA) could be as high as 
43.4%. The exception to this rule are REIT dividends that are attributable to 
capital gains from the disposition of real-estate assets by the REIT.255 These 
“capital gains dividends” do qualify for the lower 23.8% tax rate.256 
On its face, the shareholder-level price seem to be worth the trouble. 
Under the classical double-tax model (applying pre-TCJA rates), the 
combined effective rate of 35% corporate level tax, plus 23.8% tax on 
dividends is 50.47%.257 This is higher is higher than the maximum possible 
effective shareholder-level rate of 43.4%.  
The idea of a REIT spinoff transaction is to enable a corporation whose 
primary activity is not in real estate investment, to take advantage of the REIT 
regime. A stylized example can help to illustrate such scheme. 
Assume RetailCo is a corporation that owns and operates large retail 
stores. RetailCo cannot qualify as a REIT, because its primary business is in 
retail, not in real estate investment. Nonetheless, the stores themselves are 
real estate assets, and represent a significant portion of RetailCo’s assets. 
ReatilCo can take advantage of the REIT regime by spinning off its retail 
stores into a REIT as follows:  
First, RetaiCo creates a new corporation, REITCO. RetailCo then 
contributes all of its stores to REITCO. Second, RetailCo distributes (spins 
off) REITCO to its shareholders. From a shareholder point of view, nothing 
of economic significance has changed. The only change is a legal change: 
instead of owning stock in one corporation, shareholders’ interests are now 
divided between two entities. One that owns the stores (REITCO), and 
another that operates the stores (RetailCo). Before a 2015 change in law, the 
spinoff could be structured as a non-taxable transaction. 258  
After the spinoff, REITCO leases the stores (i.e., the real estate assets) to 
RetailCo, and RetailCo continue to operate them in its retail business. The 
                                                 
253 I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(11). REIT managers may designate dividends attributable 
to REIT-level capital gains, as “capital gains dividend” taxed at preferred rates. I.R.C. § 
857(b)(3)(c).  
254 See, supra notes 198-199 and accompanying discussion. 
255 In REIT spinoffs, however, very little REIT income is expected to be capital gains 
income. The reason is that the REIT is not organized with the primary purpose of acquiring 
and disposing of real estate (which would generate capital gains), but rather to service the 
operation of the original corporation. Most of the REIT income will be from the lease 
payments, which are classified as ordinary income (rather than capital gain). 
256 Supra note 253. 
257 If corporate income is taxed at 35%, this leaves 65% of the income to distribute. If 
all income is distributed and taxed at 23.8%, the shareholder is left with 0.65x(1-0.238), or 
49.53% of the income, for an effective tax rate of 50.47%.  
258 Supra note 243. 
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lease payments are deductible to the RetailCo, and eliminate much of the 
RetailCo’s tax base. The income from the leasing payments shows up on 
REITCO’s books. Ordinarily, such payment would be taxable to REITCO. 
However, REITCO can now elect to be a REIT. The reason is that all of 
REITCO’s assets are qualifying real estate assets (the stores), and all of 
REITCO’s income is qualifying real estate income (lease payments).  
As a REIT, REITCO now must distribute all of its income from the lease 
payments to shareholders. While this distribution is deductible to REITCO 
(thus eliminating corporate-level income), the dividend receipts are 
includible to shareholders. The result is that nothing of substance had 
changed. The only income producing activity is still the retail income. The 
shareholders are the same shareholders. The only difference is that by the 
magic of paperwork RetailCo became two corporations. RetailCo can now 
make a deductible payment to REITCO, but REITCO is not required pay tax 
on such receipt as long as it distributes its profits to shareholders. 
  
ii. REIT Spinoffs as STCTs 
Consider, for example a taxable shareholder in a publicly traded 
corporation. If the corporation earns $100, the corporation will be subject to 
a pre-TCJA tax of 35%, leaving $65 for distribution. If such amount is 
distributed, the shareholders will be subject to additional tax of 23.8%, 
leaving the shareholder with net income of $49.53. The combined double-tax 
burden is 50.57%. If, on the other hand, the corporation turns into a REIT and 
earns $100, and the entire amount is distributed, there is no corporate-level 
tax. The shareholder, however, may be subject to tax as high as 43.4% on 
such distribution. This is better, so it seems, than 50.57%. 
This assumes, however, that in the comparable non-REIT structures, the 
corporation distributes all its available earnings. There is no reason to assume 
that this is the case.259 Consider, for example, a situation in which only half 
of the corporate $100 profit is distributed.260 At 35% corporate tax rate, the 
corporation will be subject to $35 of tax. This would leave $65 to be 
distributed. If only half is distributed (meaning, $32.5) the shareholder-level 
tax liability is $7.735 (23.8% times $32.5). The total current tax liability is 
therefore $35 + $7.735 = $42.735, which is lower than the current tax liability 
under the REIT alternative. This is, again, a counter-intuitive result, because 
REIT conversions are perceived to be beneficial to shareholders from a tax 
                                                 
259 See, Borden, supra note 20 at 542 (“[C]orporations are not subject to a distribution 
requirement. Corporations can therefore avoid subjecting their income to double tax by 
reinvesting the income and not making distributions”). 
260 This is a conservative assumption, because corporations typically distribute less than 
half of their income. Id. (“In fact, in practice corporations distribute no more than 25 percent 
of their taxable income on average”). 
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point of view.  
Table 5 below summarizes this outcome: 
 
Table 5 
 Regular Corporation 
(distributes 50% of available 
profits) 
REIT (must distribute all 
available profits) 
Gross corporate income $100 $100 
Corporate-level tax (35%) ($35) $0 
(all profits distributed 
and deducted) 
Profits available for 
distribution 
$65 $100 
Profits distributed $32.5 $100 
Shareholder-level tax 23.8% x $32.5 = ($7.735) 43.4% x $100 = ($43.4) 




There is another important point to consider in the context of REIT 
spinoffs and conversions. In a regular corporation, shareholders can control 
the timing of recognition of the second level of tax. Assume for example, that 
the corporation (before turning into a REIT), did not regulatory distribute it 
earnings. While the 35% corporate-level tax is imposed when the corporation 
earns the income, the shareholder level tax (23.8%) is only due when the 
shareholder decides to sell the stock. The shareholder is able to defer the tax 
liability, and at least in theory, reduce the net present value of the tax 
burden.261 Consider for example, a shareholder with a basis of $25 that plans 
to defer the sale of a stock worth $65 for four years, and that the market 
discount rate is five percent. The net present value of the future tax is about 
$7.83 [(23.8% x (65-25) / (1+0.05)^4]. Combined with the $35 corporate-
level tax (due today), the NPV of the total tax burden is $42.83. This is less 
than the $43.4 due today under the REIT scenario. 
Finally, recall that one of the potential benefits of corporate taxation—
per Kanda and Levmore—is to alleviate conflicts of interest among 
shareholders regarding in-corporate dispositions. Under their theory, when 
entity-level actions generate shareholder-level tax liabilities, managers (who 
are also shareholders) may prefer their own tax interest and, for example, 
delay corporate dispositions in order to delay shareholder-level taxes. This 
problem is re-introduced in the REIT contexts. Since REIT must distribute 
most of its profits managers may engage in corporate-level profit 
management in order to delay or advance profits recognition, thus timing the 
required distributions to benefit management’s tax interests. 
                                                 
261 “In theory”, since corporate earnings may also increase, and such increasing earnings 
are subject to tax and increase future distributions. Does it is not necessarily that deferral 
reduces the NPV of the tax liability. 
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STCTS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM 
Thus far, I outlined a counter-intuitive descriptive claim: Management 
actions that reduce corporate tax liability may increase the overall tax burden 
on some shareholders. Such outcome is possible because managers and tax-
exempt shareholders rationally cooperate against the interest of taxable 
shareholders. The purposes in this part is to explain why it matters (Subpart 
A), and to offer potential solutions to the problem (Subpart B). 
a. The Legal and Normative Implications of STCTs 
i. Shareholder Primacy and Managers’ Duty to Reduce 
Corporate Taxes 
Some commentators argue that managers have a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders to reduce corporate tax liability.262 As a matter of positive law, 
this argument is questionable. No law that I am aware of requires managers 
to engage in corporate tax planning, and no court that I am aware of has 
interpreted the law to find such a duty.263  
However, it is worth considering the rational of such arguments in the 
context of STCTs. The suggestion that management has a fiduciary duty to 
increase shareholders wealth by reducing corporate taxes makes an explicit 
normative choice, adopting the shareholder primacy view of the corporation. 
Under this view, normative assessment of corporate laws (and management 
actions) is based on whether they enhance shareholder value.264 “Shareholder 
primacy is said to offer management a way to evaluate decisions within the 
framework of a single-valued objective function”,265 that is, shareholder 
welfare. The shareholder primacy view is a prevalent view in academic 
discourse.266 
                                                 
262 See, supra note 6. 
263 See, supra note 7. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah explored this question at length from 
both practical and theoretical point of view, considering the duty of managers to reduce 
corporate taxes under different corporate theories. See, Avi-Yonah, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, supra note 5. He concludes that “under any of the major views of 
corporations, corporations should not be permitted to engage in strategic behavior designed 
solely to minimize its taxes.” Id., at 28. 
264 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. Corp. L. 637, 637-8 (2006) (describing shareholder primacy as a normative linchpin to 
assess corporate law); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize 
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2017 J. of L. Fin. & Account. 247 (2017) (Argue 
that companies should operate to increase shareholders welfare).   
265 Fisch, id., at 661 
266 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 33 (2012) “[M]any legal 
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However, the shareholder primacy approach has been criticized, among 
others, because it contains an implicit assumption that common shareholders 
share homogenous interests.267 In reality, shareholders have diverse 
investment tastes, which translate to different preferences for corporate 
behavior. “Recognizing these differences reveals that the idea of a single 
objectively measurable “shareholder value” is not only quixotic, but 
intellectually incoherent.”268  
STCTs offer a practical example supporting the critical view of the 
shareholder primacy approach. The argument that managers engage in 
corporate level tax planning to benefit shareholders implicitly assumes that 
shareholders tax interests are homogenous. As I have shown, this assumption 
cannot be reconciled with how tax law operates in practice.  STCTs may 
increase value to some shareholders but reduce it to others. This fact exposes 
the logical incoherence of the argument that managers must engage in 
corporate tax planning. If a corporate tax-reducing scheme may result in 
increased tax-burden on shareholders, how can one argue that managers have 
a duty to engage in such behavior under a shareholder value-maximization 
theory?  
Even if one adopts the view that managers must attempt to maximize 
shareholders’ value, there is a real practical difficulty with articulating 
managers’ duties in the context of STCTs. Managers do not know (and cannot 
know) what are the personal tax consequences to each shareholder stemming 
from a particular transaction. Managers simply do not have access to 
shareholders’ personal tax information.269 As a result, managers can never 
tell upfront whether an STCT is expected to increase or decrease shareholder 
value in the aggregate. 
To see why this observation is important, it is helpful to unpack some of 
                                                 
scholars today passionately embrace shareholder value as a normative goal… The perceived 
superiority of the shareholder-oriented model has inspired a generation of would-be 
reformers to work tirelessly to ‘improve’ corporate governance so managers focus on 
shareholder value”).  
267 Fisch, supra note 264, at 661. (“To the extent that the interests of different 
stakeholders conflict, the stakeholder model offers no principled basis for choosing among 
them. … Within the shareholder class, the investors vary considerably among such 
dimensions as the time frame over which they invest, the extent to which they trade versus 
passively holding the corporation’s stock, their degree of diversification, the extent to which 
they hold nonequity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging positions that they 
hold, and so forth”); STOUT, id., at 60 (“The standard shareholder-oriented model assumes a 
hypothetical, homogeneous, abstract shareholder who does not and cannot exist).”  
268 Stout, id., at 61. 
269 Marian, Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulations, supra note 17, at 42-3 
(“From a legal standpoint, privacy safeguards protect most taxpayer information, which 
makes it impossible to acquire such information without a waiver from investors”). 
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the components of managers’ fiduciary duties and explore them in the context 
of STCTs. Managers’ fiduciary duties include, in broad terms, the duty of 
loyalty (also known as the duty of fair dealing) and the duty of care. 
Under the duty of loyalty, a manager “commits allegiance to the 
enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders must prevail over any individual interest of his own.”270 
Corporate officers “can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor 
expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-
dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all 
stockholders generally.”271 
Due to shareholders’ tax heterogeneity, STCT benefits do not necessarily 
flow to “all stockholders generally”. In some STCTs, the benefit may flow 
only to tax-exempt shareholders and managers at the expense of taxable 
shareholders. In such a case, it is not only that managers have no duty to 
engage in tax planning, but taxable shareholders may reasonably argue that 
by receiving a gross-up payment, managers engage is self-dealing. Courts 
have indeed recognized the duty of managers and majority shareholders to 
“deal fairly with their corporation and minority shareholders.”272 If managers 
would not have approved the transaction without the tax gross up, it could 
suggest that managers preferred their own interests to the interest of taxable 
shareholders and the corporation. Whether this is the case, is a transaction-
specific question, and requires a fact-intensive inquiry. 
The other major component of managers’ fiduciary duties is the duty of 
care. The duty of care is the duty “to perform the director's or officer's 
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily 
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise …”.273 
While STCTs may reduce corporate-level taxes, it is difficult to argue that 
the duty of care imposes an affirmative requirement that managers engage in 
corporate tax planning. Rather, most corporate-level tax plans likely fall 
under the “business judgment rule”. Under the business judgment rule, 
managers would not breach their duty of care, as long as the managers make 
a business judgment in good faith, are not self-interested in the transaction, 
make the decision on an informed basis, and rationally believe that the 
                                                 
270 RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE §4 Intro. Note (Am. Law Inst. 
1994) (hereinafter: RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE). 
271 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
272 RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 270, at §5.01, and cases 
cited therein.  
273 Id., at §4.01. 
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judgment is in the best interest of the corporation.274 The business judgment 
rule “sharply reduces [managers] exposure to liability.”275 Courts are 
reluctant to intervene in management business decisions, and generally 
presume that management’s action is proper.276 Under such circumstances, it 
is difficult to imagine that the duty of care includes a duty to engage (or not 
to engage) in corporate tax planning, especially given that tax outcomes are 
rarely certain.277  
ii. STCTs are Inefficient 
I explained throughout this article why STCTs might be inefficient. 
STCTs are rarely Pareto-optimal and can be inefficient overall.  
STCTs expose a gap in current U.S. securities laws. The underlying 
assumption in U.S. securities laws is that as long as information is available, 
shareholders will vote against inefficient corporate transactions. Efficient 
capital market theory, however, does not take into account shareholders 
heterogeneity in tax preferences, nor does it take into account the existence 
of the unique ownership structures in U.S. equity markets. 
Tax-exempt shareholders always stand to benefit from an STCT. They 
will rationally vote for the transaction. If tax-exempts hold the majority 
vote—as is usually the case in U.S. equity markets—every STCT will receive 
shareholders’ approval, even if it is inefficient and even if all information 
about the transaction is freely available in the market.     
iii. STCTs Undo Distributional Policies 
STCTs may have a negative effect on government distributional policies. 
The crux of the argument here is that STCTs effectively shift tax burden from 
one group of taxpayers to another, through private action. 
Taxpayers may agree to shift the tax burden among themselves through 
contractual relationships. For example, sellers in private transactions may 
increase the price to account for the expected tax cost of the transaction.278 It 
                                                 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. (“Courts, when applying the business judgment rule, have often stated that a 
“presumption” exists in favor of the propriety or regularity of the actions of directors and 
officers. This correctly signifies that no inference of dereliction of duty can or should be 
drawn, for example, from the fact that a corporation has suffered a business reversal.”); 
Kamin v. American Exp. Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 914 (1976) (Finding no actionable claim when 
managers were aware that certain transaction structure would “result in the realization of a 
substantial income tax saving”, but chose a different structure due to “countervailing 
considerations”). 
277 See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Slager, supra note 7. 
278 For example, credit agreement include a standard provision under which borrowers agree 
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is difficult to argue against such arrangements if they are a result of a 
negotiation between willing parties, who agree to alter the legally prescribed 
tax burdens. STCTs, however, shift the corporate tax burden from the 
corporation and its managers to taxable shareholders. This shift can happen 
against the will of taxable shareholders, who have no legal recourse to 
prevent the transaction. 
Under such circumstances—where tax reduction is achieved through 
shifting of the burden to an unwilling party—distributional considerations are 
paramount. Assuming government policy aims to achieve certain 
distributional effects through the tax system, STCTs frustrate such policy. 
b. Paths to Address the Agency Problems of STCTs 
In this subpart I offer three potential courses of action to address STCTs 
agency problems: Market based solutions, tax-law based solutions, and 
corporate-law based solutions. 
i. Market based solutions 
If left to its own device, capital markets will never correct the agency 
problems associated with STCTs. As explained above, assuming rational 
behavior of market participants, and majority ownership of tax-exempt 
shareholders, shareholders will always approve STCTs. 
It has been suggested that “a gross-up could discourage the relevant 
practice by calling more attention to it.”279 This is unlikely to be a real 
deterrent. The corporate tax savings accruing to tax exempt shareholders will 
almost always outweigh the cost of the gross-up. Thus, rational decision 
making would dictate that tax-exempt shareholders vote for the gross-up. It 
is only possible to imagine a market-based solution under a capital market 
structure that is different from the one we currently have, where tax-exempt 
shareholders do not hold the majority vote. 
Another possible argument for market-based approach is to rely on 
clientele effects. Namely, the idea that investors can choose to invest in 
companies that match the investors’ tax preferences. Under this scenario, 
rational taxable shareholders should avoid investing in firms that engage in 
STCTs. As explained above,280 clientele theory is probably unhelpful in the 
context of STCTs. Unlike in the case of known corporate distribution policies 
                                                 
to increase interest payment in order to gross up lenders for any withholding tax imposed on 
interest payments. See, MICHAEL BELLUCCI & JEROME MCCLUSKEY, THE LSTA'S 
COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 122-125 (2nd ed., 2017) (Describing standard tax 
gross-op provisions in credit agreements).  
279 Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶2.7.  
280 Supra note 133 and accompanying discussion.  
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(which investors can rely on when making investment decisions), investors 
learn of an STCT only after the fact. At that point, taxable shareholders have 
already internalized any tax cost associated with the transaction, and have no 
recourse (other than to sue the corporation).  
ii. Tax-Law based solutions 
Tax law solutions can come in two forms. One, by addressing the 
underlying problem—the double-tax model—and adopt some form of 
corporate tax overhaul that would solve the problem. Second, by adopting a 
tailored solution aimed at undoing the agency problem. Both of these tax law 
avenues are not particularly promising.  
Corporate tax overhaul. One overhaul of the corporate tax system worth 
considering is integration. The first obvious problem with such a solution is 
that it does not seem politically attainable, given the heterogeneity of interests 
involved. Even if we can achieve integration, however, integration will not 
necessarily solve the agency problem identified, and may create new agency 
problems. Moreover, the huge costs of integration weigh against adopting it 
as a solution to a corporate-governance problem. 
Consider full imputation, for example. Under a full imputation system, 
corporate-level taxes serve as an “advance” on shareholder-level payment. In 
such a case, all shareholders would benefit from corporate tax reduction. 
However, other agency costs may present themselves. 
For example, managers would still have interest in lowering the 
corporate-level tax liability, to the extent management’s compensation is 
connected to after-tax outcomes. This means that managers have an incentive 
to push the bulk of the taxes to the shareholder level, for example, by delaying 
the timing of dispositions of in-corporate assets in a manner that lowers 
corporate tax. If managers are also shareholders, they may have an incentive 
to time corporate dispositions in a way that benefits their personal tax status 
(for example, cause the corporation to incur high tax liability in a year 
managers know they will have personal tax attributes to offset such liability). 
This is the tax timing problem discussed by Kanda and Levmore.281  
Integration in the form of dividend-deduction will amplify the agency 
problems associated with distribution policies.282 Managers will have an 
incentive to distribute earnings at times when distribution is the most 
beneficial to the corporation’s tax liability, for example, when the corporation 
has taxable income to offset. Thus, managers may have an incentive to 
distribute earnings for the benefit of the deduction, rather than reinvest the 
                                                 
281 Supra note 109. 
282 See, discussion supra at Part II.c. 
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corporate earning in new capital.  
A dividend-exemption system would presumably put all shareholders on 
equal footing (none pays shareholder-level tax and all enjoy corporate level 
tax reduction). However, tax-exempt shareholders are likely to object to such 
a system, because it denies them of the inherent advantage they have in 
current markets. Congress chose to grant tax-exempt status to specific 
institutions that advance certain public policy issues. A dividend-exemption 
system will undo much of the policies underlying tax exemption. 
In summary, different actors have different preferences for different 
integration systems.283 Adopting integration is not a panacea to agency costs 
associated with the heterogeneous tax preferences of shareholders. In 
addition, any integration system carries with it multiple additional costs and 
benefits. For example, moving from a double tax to a single tax model is 
likely to cause a major revenue loss. On the other hand, it may have macro-
economic benefits such as increased investment.284 These macro-economic 
effects seem to be much more important than any agency problems associated 
with STCTs. If Congress adopts integration, it should be because tax writers 
believe it is good corporate tax policy, and not because it is a solution to the 
agency problems associate with STCTs. 
Another type corporate tax overhaul that can mitigate the STCT problem 
is to require shareholders to mark-to-market (MTM) their equity holdings. 
Under an MTM regime “financial products… would be valued periodically, 
and the holder would be taxable on the change in value over the period”.285 
This means that shareholders basis of the end of each year would be adjusted 
to account for taxable gains or losses. For example, if a stock in which a 
shareholder had a basis of ten dollars appreciated by the end of the year to 
twelve dollars, the shareholder will be required to pay tax on the two-dollar 
difference, and the basis in the stock will increase to twelve dollars. 
These MTM basis adjustments mean that in an STCTs, shareholders will 
be subject to tax—at most—on changes in stock value that happened since 
the beginning of the taxable year. In such a case, it is unlikely that 
shareholders would suffer a major shareholder-level tax detriment, since the 
taxable gain is limited. This is unlike the case of shareholders who, under 
current law, may hold corporate stock for long periods, in which the stock 
                                                 
283 Doran, supra note 89.  
284 Scott Greenberg, Corporate Integration: An Important Component of Tax Reform, TAX 
FOUND. FISCAL NO. 506, 12 (Apr. 21, 2016) (“Corporate integration would lower the 
combined tax burden on corporate income, which would increase investment and economic 
growth in the United States”). 
285 Redd Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 243, 247 (1992). 
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accumulate significant appreciation while shareholder basis remains low. An 
MTM regime would make the shareholder-level tax costs associated with 
STCTs minuscule. 
There are two problems, however, that make MTM an unsuitable 
solution. First, a MTM regime seem to be politically unattainable. MTM has 
been discussed for decades in the United States, and received widespread 
academic support.286Political resistance, however, stopped all attempts at 
MTM reforms in their tracks. Second, like integration, MTM would 
constitute a major overhaul of the system by which we tax corporations. It 
seems extreme to adopt such a system just to solve the governance issues of 
STCTs. It will be a nice derivative benefit of such system, though, if it is ever 
adopted.         
If integration and MTM seems like an overkill, it is worth considering 
narrowly tailored tax solutions. Unfortunately, tailored tax solutions for 
corporate governance problems have been tried in the past, and spectacularly 
failed. The reason is that insiders are simply able to contract around any such 
tax provision. An obvious example is gross-up payments in inversions, which 
bypass the excise tax of Section 4985. Section 4985 is a governance-driven 
provision, the purpose of which is to have managers internalize the 
shareholder-level tax costs of inversions. Managers and tax-exempt investors 
simply contract around this provision by allowing the corporation to gross-
up the tax cost to managers. 
Other governance-related tax provision that dot the IRC have failed in 
similar tasks.287 For example, Section 162(m) supposedly creates a tax 
disincentive for excessive executive compensation. It does so by denying a 
corporation a deduction for executive compensation in excess of one million 
dollars.288 However, Section 162(m) main effect has been to change the form 
(rather than the amount) of management compensation, from cash, to 
incentive pay in stock options and other derivatives that are exempt from the 
limitation.289 This created much more opaque compensation schemes, which 
                                                 
286 Mark Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70 Tax L. Rev. 1, fn3 (2016) (“There are many 
proposals to replace the corporate income tax with an income tax assessed on the changes in 
the market value of corporate securities”, and source cited therein). 
287 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (denying deductions for excessive executive 
compensation); I.R.C. § 280G (denying deductions for certain golden parachute payments);  
I.R.C. §;4999 (imposing excise tax on certain golden parachute payments); I.R.C. § 5881 
(imposing excise tax on greenmail payments); None of these provisions meaningfully 
remedied the corporate governance issue they were addressing. 
288 I.R.C. § 162(m). 
289 Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶3.1.3 (“Section 162(m) is not an encouraging precedent. 
When enacted in 1993, it was explained as a limit on the amount of pay. Nevertheless, its 
main effect has been on the type of pay, since it offers a widely used exception for 
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are harder for shareholders to monitor. It has even been suggested that section 
162(m) carries a partial blame for the options backdating scandals of the early 
2000s.290    
To summarize, any specifically tailored tax disincentive is unlikely to 
prevent unwanted managerial behavior. It is more likely to increase the cost 
of unwanted behavior by incentivizing expensive contractual workarounds.  
iii. Corporate Law Solutions 
Corporate-law based solutions to the agency problems of STCTs can 
come in several forms: empowering the minority (taxable) shareholders in 
STCT voting, compensating minority shareholders for their tax costs, or 
forcing managers to internalize personal costs associated with STCTs. 
Empowering taxable shareholders. Since only taxable shareholders are 
likely to suffer a net detriment in an STCT, a possible course of action would 
be to require that—in addition to regular shareholder majority—a majority of 
taxable shareholders approve the transaction. Assuming taxable shareholders 
behave rationally, they will only approve transactions in which the net 
corporate tax benefits flowing to them exceed the shareholder-level tax cost. 
While such requirement offers an elegant theoretical solution, is suffers 
from several real-world problems. First, it would be a mistake to treat to all 
taxable shareholders as a single class of shareholders for tax purposes. 
Taxable shareholders individualized tax-positions vary significantly based 
on, among others, each shareholder’s personal tax attributes, tax rates, and 
holding period in the stock.291 It is possible that a majority of taxable 
shareholders would vote for an STCT, when some taxable shareholders still 
suffer a detriment. Nonetheless, because fewer shareholders suffer a 
detriment, the inefficiency cost is likely much smaller in such a case 
compared with current situation. Requiring a majority vote of taxable 
shareholders is an imperfect proxy to shareholders’ tax preferences, yet one 
that offers an improvement. 
A second problem of requiring a majority of taxable shareholders to vote 
for an STCT may be the holdout problem. For example, in corporations with 
very few taxable shareholders, a small minority of shareholders may find 
                                                 
‘performance-based compensation’); See, also, JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 137, at 43 
(“The $1 million deduction limitation was designed to address corporate governance 
concerns that top executives were receiving excessive compensation. The experience with 
Enron indicates that the limitation is not effective in achieving its purposes”). 
290 Schitzer, id. (“Section 162(m) may even have motivated some firms to commit fraud. 
By favoring options that were at-the-money when granted, the rule creates a tax incentive to 
lie about the grant date”); For a description of the options backdating scandal, see, Jesse M. 
Fried, Option Backdating and its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (2008) 
291 See, supra notes 17-18 and accompanying discussion.  
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itself in a position to prevent an otherwise efficient transaction, using such 
position to extract a payout from the corporation. Whether such problem is 
significant is an empirical question. It depends on the size of the taxable 
shareholders’ holding. However, a payout to taxable holdouts is functionally 
no different from tax gross-up payments to managers. As long as the gross-
up payment is less than the corporate tax savings, the transaction is still 
efficient, and shareholders will approve it. If holdout shareholders operate 
rationally, it will make no sense for them to require a payout that is in excess 
of the corporate tax savings, because in such a case they are likely to incur a 
loss themselves. 
On balance, I believe that a solution empowering taxable shareholders in 
the context of STCTs is worthy of serious consideration.        
Compensating taxable shareholders for shareholder-level taxes. A 
different way to assure STCTs are efficient is by requiring the corporation to 
compensate taxable shareholders for their tax cost, the same way that gross-
up payment compensate managers. This “global tax gross-up” will burden 
the corporation with significant additional cost. However, as long as the 
corporate tax saving outweighs the cost of the global gross-up, rational 
shareholders will approve the transaction. The elegance of this theoretical 
solution is that it forces tax-exempt shareholders to internalize the cost to 
taxable shareholders, instead of shifting the cost to taxable shareholders. 
Again, there are several real-world problems with this solution. First, it 
may not be the least-wasteful solution. Under the previous solution discussed 
(requiring a majority of taxable shareholders to approve the transaction), only 
some taxable shareholders may demand compensation. Under a global gross-
up, a payoff is required to all taxable shareholders. This seems like an 
excessive, largely avoidable cost. It is better to pay a few taxable shareholders 
rather than all taxable shareholders. 
Another problem with the global gross-up idea is that it is impossible for 
the corporation to assess the cost of the global gross-up. The corporation does 
not have private taxpayer-information on shareholders necessary to calculate 
the expected tax cost for each shareholder.292 Nonetheless, a solution would 
be to use (again) and imperfect proxy to calculate such cost. For example, 
one could assume that the tax cost for which managers are being grossed-up, 
is incurred by each of the other taxable shareholder. It is possible to calculate 
a proportion of gross-up amount per share (or other equity rights) held by 
managers, and pay each taxable shareholder based on such ratio. 
Forcing managers to internalize costs. Finally, it is possible to think of a 
regulatory solution that forces managers to internalize their personal tax cost. 
For example, we could have an outright legal prohibition on tax gross-up 
                                                 
292 Supra note 269. 
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payments. 
This solution is unlikely to be successful, mainly because it is impossible 
to enforce. A ban of gross-up payments is likely to result in contractual work-
around that result in other inefficiencies. For example, managers will demand 
increased compensation, or compensation in formats that are not subject to 
taxation in STCTs. Not only the problem remains, but it is also likely that the 
opacity of managers’ compensation structure will increase. 
To summarize, market-based and tax-based solutions to the agency 
problems of STCTs do not hold much promise. Of the corporate-law-based 
solutions I discussed above, it seems that the best course of action is to 
empower taxable shareholders. This can be achieved, for example, by 
requiring that a majority of taxable shareholders vote to approve an STCT. 
   
CONCLUSION 
I questioned whether legal and successful corporate tax reduction 
schemes are always beneficial to shareholders. I find the answer is in the 
negative. 
I identified a category of common corporate transactions, the generic 
characteristic of which is that they directly affect shareholder-level taxes. In 
such “shareholder taxable corporate transactions” (STCT), any corporate 
level tax savings must be weighed against the shareholder-level tax cost. 
Since shareholders have heterogeneous tax positions, some shareholders 
may lose value in STCTs, while others gain value. STSCs are therefore rarely 
Pareto-optimal at the shareholder level. It is also reasonable to assume that 
some STCTs are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. This would be the case where the 
loosing shareholders lose more value in an STCT, that the gain accruing to 
shareholders who are benefiting from the STCT. 
I also explained why the unique ownership structure in U.S. equity 
markets cause shareholders to approve inefficient STCTs, even when 
information is freely available in the market. Tax-exempt investors hold the 
majority vote in many corporations traded on U.S. equity markets. Such 
investors have no shareholder-level tax to consider. They will always vote for 
a corporate tax-saving transaction, even if it is detrimental to other (taxable) 
shareholders. 
Corporate managers, who hold taxable equity in the corporation or are 
otherwise subject to personal tax because of an STCT, may not favor STCTs. 
However, if the managers’ personal tax cost is less than the corporate-level 
tax savings, managers and tax-exempt investor would rationally agree to have 
the corporation indemnify managers for their personal tax cost. This will 
defuse management’s disincentive in the transaction, while imposing an 
additional cost on taxable shareholders, in the form of and additional financial 
burden on the corporation. 
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The problems described above are likely to get worse under the recently 
enacted tax reform. The reason is that recent reform significantly reduced 
corporate tax rates, while leaving shareholder-level tax rates largely 
unchanged. This means that any corporate tax saving is likely to be less 
beneficial (it saves less taxes), while shareholders taxes remain just as 
detrimental. 
I explored several potential solutions to the problem and concluded that 
the best (even if not perfect) solution is to empower taxable shareholders in 
the context of STCTs.  
 
APPENDIX 
It is helpful to generalize the arguments presented in Section II by 
presenting simple a formal model. The model demonstrates the conditions 
under which STCTs hurt taxable shareholders (meaning, are not Paetro-
optimal), or are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. 
Assume, as in the stylized examples in Section II, that in the absence of 
an STCT, taxable shareholders pay no shareholder-level tax. In the presence 
of an STCT, taxable shareholders are subject to shareholder-level taxes both 
on the marginal earnings resulting from the STCT, as well as the built-in 
appreciation in their equity prior to the STCT. I denote the relevant variables 
as follows: 
 
V – Corporate Value before an STCT.  
Rc – Corporate Tax Rate.  
I – Reduction in Taxable Income Due to an STCT. 
ΔV – Corporate savings due to structuring (meaning, ΔV = I·Rc). 
P = Proportional Interest of Taxable Shareholders. 
Rp = Shareholders Personal Tax Rate. 
B = Taxable Shareholders’ Basis in the Stock. 
 
A.  Pareto Inefficient STCTs 
Taxable shareholders are worse off when increase in value of their 
corporate holding flowing to them from corporate tax savings, is less than 
increased tax owed due to the STCT. Formally: 
 
PΔV <  Rp(P(V + ΔV) – B) = RpPV + RpPΔV – RpB 
 
PΔV – RpPΔV < RpPV – RpB 
 
PΔV (1 - Rp) < Rp(PV – B) 
 
We substitute ΔV: 
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   (1)  
 
This makes vivid that, as the corporate rate decreases, the left side of the 
equation decreases, meaning that all else equal, a decrease in corporate tax 
rate will push toward taxable shareholders being worse off. 
 
B.  Kaldor-Hicks Inefficient STCTs 
 
STCTs are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient when taxable shareholders tax cost 
exceeds the total tax saved at the corporate level. Formally, when: 
 
ΔV <  Rp(P(V + ΔV) – B) = RpPV + RpPΔV – RpB 
 
ΔV – RpPΔV <  RpPV – RpB 
 




		      
 




C.  Management Tax Gross-Up 
Finally, it is also possible to derive the formula for the management gross-
up payment, under the assumption that a gross up makes management 
indifferent to personal tax cost. Assume that: 
 
M = Proportional Equity Interest of Management 
G = Gross-Up Payment 
S = Tax Savings to the Corporation. 
V1 = Corporation’s gross value after the transaction. 
 
To make this modeling a bit more realistic (and for the sake of simplicity), 
we shall assume that management’s shareholder-level tax is in the form of an 
excise tax, imposed on management equity value. 
Managers are indifferent to shareholder-level tax if their pre-STCT value 
is the same as their post-STCT gross value, reduced by their shareholder-
level taxes, increased by the gross up payment, and reduced again by the tax 
on the gross-up payment. Formally, when: 
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MV = MV1 – RpMV1 + G – RpG.  
 
= MV1(1 - Rp) + G(1 - Rp) 
 
= (1 - Rp)( MV1 + G) 
 
Note, However, that in this case, the post-transaction value must account 
for the fact the any tax benefit to the corporation, is reduced by the gross-up 
payment. Namely: 
 




MV = (1 - Rp)( MV + MS – MG + G) 
 
MV = MV + MS – MG + G – RpMV – RpMS + RpMG – RpG 
 
0 = M(S – RpV – RpS) + G(1 – M + RpM - Rp)  
 
G 	
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